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"Judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to
no greater immunity from criticism than other persons
or institutions . . . [J Judges must be kept mindful of their limitations and
of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous
stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt."

DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON
DAVID A. STRAUSS
AND GEOFFREY R. STONE

—Felix Frankfurter

" . . . while it is proper that people should find fault when
their judges fail, it is only reasonable that they should recognize the
difficulties. . . . Let them be severely brought to book,
when they go wrong, but by those who will take the trouble
to understand them."
—Learned Hand
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ELIZABETH F. EMENS

AGGRAVATING YOUTH: ROPER v
SIMMONS AND AGE DISCRIMINATION

At the penalty phase of Christopher Simmons's murder trial, the
prosecutor argued to the jury that Simmons's youth should be considered aggravating, rather than mitigating:
Let's look at the mitigating circumstances. . . . Age, he says.
Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary? Doesn't
that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite
the contrary.1

The prosecutor's argument is striking. Indeed, when Roper v
Simmons2 reached the Supreme Court this Term, his argument was
criticized in briefs, at oral argument, in the majority opinion, and
in a dissent.3 These words from the prosecutor played, I will argue,
Elizabeth F. Emens is Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: My thanks to the following people for helpful conversations and comments on draft material: Ursula Bentele, Emily Buss, Sarah Cleveland, Geraldine Downey,
Richard Emens, Jeffrey Fagan, Robert Ferguson, Victor Goldberg, Anil Kalhan, Alice
Kessler-Harris, Sarah Lawsky, James Liebman, Martha Minow, Martha Nussbaum, Elizabeth Scott, Reva Siegel, Rachel Smith, Geoffrey Stone, David Strauss, Susan Sturm, Cass
Sunstein, Jenia Iontcheva Taylor, John Witt, Kenji Yoshino, and participants in the 1010 Workshop and the Law and Culture Colloquium at Columbia Law School. I also thank
Sloan Speck for excellent research assistance, and the library staff at Columbia Law School,
Beth Williams in particular, and at the University of Chicago Law School for their work
obtaining key sources, including elusive trial transcript material from diverse locales.
1
Transcript of Record on Appeal (filed Dec 19, 1994) at 1156-57, State v Simmons, 944
SW2d 165 (Mo 1997) (en bane) (No 77269) (hereafter "TT").
2
Roper v Simmons, 125 S Ct 1183 (2005).
3
For example, Brief for Respondent at *30, 2004 W L 1947812; Brief for NAACP Legal
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a crucial role in the Court's decision that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits states from executing people for crimes they committed
when they were younger than eighteen.4
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy invokes this aspect of
the prosecutor's argument to reply to Missouri's (and Justice
O'Connor's) claim that juries should decide the relevance of youth
on a case-by-case basis because youth is an inexact proxy for diminished culpability. Kennedy, in response, expresses his concern that
juries will not be able to weigh an individual's age properly, and that
the risk is thus too great that they will get it wrong, citing among
other things the prosecutor's argument that youth should be an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor. He seems worried not only
that juries lack the skill required to identify the cases in which youth
should be treated as mitigating, but also that they will sometimes
weigh youth in exactly the wrong way.
This concern seems surprising in an opinion that declares that
the differences between juveniles and adults are so "marked and
well understood" that we can draw a categorical rule based on age
in the weighty context of the death penalty.5 But, as Kennedy explains, there are numerous reasons to fear that juries may make
mistakes when deciding whether the youth of a particular juvenile
offender diminishes his culpability. Moreover, while sentencing
someone to death incorrectly is always serious, mistakenly ending
a young life may be even more so. Society justifies treating youth
differently from adults in many contexts in part on the ground that
youth will grow up and enter the majority class; an unwarranted
execution of a young offender may undermine that system.
But it's not just the weight of the decision—whether to execute
a young offender—or the potential number of errors—an unanswered empirical question—that, in Kennedy's view, requires a rule
rather than a standard. Rather, the prosecutor's argument that youth
is aggravating, rather than mitigating, highlights a peculiarly unacceptable type of error: the possibility of executing a young offender because a jury erred based on categorical disfavor; that is,
because a jury treated a member of this vulnerable group worse
Defense Fund, et al, as Amici Curiae, at 18 n 26, 2004 WL 1636450; Transcript of Oral
Argument at *10-*ll, 2004 WL 2387647; Simmons, 125 S Ct at 1189, 1197; id at 1215
(O'Connor, J, dissenting).
4
Simmons, 125 S Ct at 1200.
5
Id at 1197.
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precisely because he is a member of that group. To persecute when
we should protect is to commit an error of great magnitude, especially in the domain of capital punishment. And so Kennedy embraces certain age-based stereotypes that mitigate culpability—that
youth are more reckless, more susceptible to influence, and less
formed in their characters—and uses those stereotypes to justify a
prophylactic rule against executing any juveniles.
Read in its best light, Kennedy's opinion thus seems to turn on
the insight that while age-based classifications are rational—they
are a good proxy for various aspects of behavior—particular judgments based on age are not necessarily rational. To the contrary,
our judgments based on age may be distorted, or even inverted,
because of wrongheaded thoughts and, especially, feelings. In the
context of death penalty sentencing, among others, we think we
favor youth, and we think we should favor youth, but in reality we
may disfavor youth. Kennedy's reasoning thus suggests that, in at
least this context, the law must embrace a categorical rule to align
how we treat young people under law with how we think we do
and should treat them.
Kennedy's analysis of the "national consensus" question might
be read to employ a similar logic. He concludes that a majority of
states opposes the juvenile death penalty because he counts the states
that completely outlaw the death penalty as opposing the juvenile
death penalty. Justice Scalia argues in dissent that a state's general
position on the death penalty does not bear on the question of
whether a special rule should protect juveniles from the death penalty where it exists. Kennedy's contrary conclusion might be understood to rest in part on the very concern that animates his proportionality analysis: For a state to oppose the death penalty for
adults but not for juveniles is both plausible and troubling for the
same reasons that the prosecutor's argument that youth is aggravating is plausible and troubling. That is, juveniles are a less culpable
included group of offenders, so if a state opposes the death penalty
generally, it must (that is, it should) oppose it for juveniles. It would
be normatively unacceptable, although possible, that negative attitudes toward and fear of juveniles would lead people to think
juveniles deserve the death penalty when adults do not. In short,
we require rules to align our legal treatment of juveniles with our
favorable attitudes toward them.
This tension between the rationality of age-based classifications,
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on the one hand, and unacknowledged negative attitudes toward
age-based groups, on the other, links Simmons to a frequently overlooked aspect of age-discrimination law. In the same month it decided Simmons, the Court concluded in Smith v City of Jackson6 that
disparate-impact claims are available under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA).7 But Smith also seems to suggest that
because age is rationally related to many job requirements (i.e., age
is often a good proxy for ability), and because age discrimination
is not motivated by dislike or intolerance (as opposed to irrational
stereotyping), the statute's reasonable factors other than age
(RFOA) defense swallows up most disparate-impact claims.8 Smith
may be too sanguine, however, about the reasonableness of employment decisions that have an age-related disparate impact: Recent work in social psychology suggests that we dislike older people
much more than we think we do.9
Thus, the principle underlying Kennedy's proportionality analysis—which also finds its way into his national consensus reasoning—could apply to ADEA jurisprudence: Age is a rational proxy
for certain characteristics, but because we often overlook our negative attitudes based on age, we should be wary of the age-based
classifications and effects we create. More may be behind our apparently rational calculations in the context of age than we are
willing or able to admit. We may think we have neutral or positive
attitudes, but negative attitudes and stereotypes may underlie our
decisions without our knowledge. Standing by itself, this claim does
not demonstrate that Simmons was rightly decided. But it does suggest that the decision is undergirded by a coherent and plausible
rationale, one that has implications for other debates about the
application of antidiscrimination principles.
The following discussion proceeds infiveparts. Part I introduces
the crime, the precedent, and the opinions in Simmons. Part II
examines the majority's proportionality analysis, in which the Court
concludes that youth's relevance in a given case should not be left
to the jury. Part III applies these themes to the dispute between
Kennedy and Scalia over how, in evaluating whether a national
consensus opposes the juvenile death penalty, to count the states
6

Smith v City of Jackson, 125 S Ct 1536 (2005).
29 USC §§ 621-34(2000).
* Smith, 125 S Ct at 1540.
9
See notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
7
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that have outlawed the death penalty altogether. Part IV speculates
on how the idea of irrational judgments about rational classifications
might inform the analysis of cases arising under another prophylactic legal rule based on age, the ADEA. Part V concludes.
I. THE CASE AND ITS CONTEXT
A. THE CONTEXT

1. The crime. In 1993, when Christopher Simmons was seventeen
years old and a junior in high school, he murdered a neighbor,
Shirley Crook. He was the apparent ringleader of a plan with two
other teens to break into a house, burglarize it, and, according to
some of the witnesses at trial, murder the occupants. He supposedly told his friends that they could get away with it because they
were juveniles.10
At 2 a.m. on Thursday, September 9, 1993, Simmons and his
two friends met at the trailer of an older neighbor;11 one boy
10

125 S Ct at 1187 ("Simmons assured his friends they could 'get away with it' because
they were minors."); State ex rel Simmons v Roper, 112 SW3d 397, 419 (Mo 2003) (Price
Jr., J, dissenting) ("Prior to the robbery, petitioner stated to his accomplice that they could
commit a robbery and murder and get away with it because they were juveniles."). The
accounts of what Simmons supposedly said in this regard vary. See, e.g., TT at 840 ("They
said that they could do it; and [Simmons] said they could do it and not get charged for
it because they are juveniles, and nobody would think that juveniles would do it." (quoting
Brian Moomey, see note 11)); id at 99 (stating that Moomey will testify that he overheard
Simmons saying to other teens that "nobody will think you guys are capable of this because
you are juveniles" (quoting John Applebaum of the Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney's Office)).
11
125 S Ct at 1187. The older neighbor, twenty-nine-year-old Brian Moomey, whom
the neighborhood boys called "Thunder Dad," was an ex-con at whose trailer Simmons
and his friends gathered and drank and did drugs. Moomey was a key prosecution witness
at Simmons's trial; he came forward to supply evidence against Simmons after he heard
that the police wanted to talk with him (Moomey) in connection with the murder. Simmons's brief makes the reader wonder how much influence Moomey had over the teens,
and also what role was played by the third boy who abandoned the plan at the trailer—
fifteen-year-old John Tessmer, a boy who, unlike Simmons, did have a record of past
offenses, who was Moomey's "best friend" and "Number One Thunder Cat" (Moomey's
words), and who was the other key prosecution witness, in addition to the police who
testified about Simmons's confession. Brief for Respondent at *2-*3 (cited in note 3).
Simmons's trial counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that the "talk in the neighborhood" was that "Moomey was letting young men drink in his house and that they were
doing drugs there and that he would have them commit crimes for him." Transcript of
Record on Appeal (filed July 18, 1996) at 383, State v Simmons, 944 SW2d 165 (Mo 1997)
(en bane) (No 77269). Simmons's trial counsel also asserted that Simmons had told him
that Moomey "was aware of what was going on and had helped plan it." Id at 433. The
jury clearly did not doubt that Simmons committed the murder, and the trial transcript
gives one little reason to question that conclusion, but parts of the story and the testimony
give one pause about Simmons's motivation to rob and then to kill and his role in planning
the events.
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apparently abandoned the plan, but the other two proceeded to
the Crook house and opened the back door by reaching through
an open window. When Shirley Crook, home alone, called out
"who's there?" Simmons recognized Crook: He had been in a
minor auto accident with her just after he got his license. He
thought she recognized him too, and, depending on which source
you consult, this moment of recognition either confirmed his resolve to kill her, or inspired him to kill her in the first place.12
Simmons and his friend duct-taped her mouth knd eyes and transported her by van to a nearby river, where they bound her hands
and feet with electrical wire, covered her face with a towel, and
threw her in the river to drown.13
On the afternoon of September 9, Shirley Crook's husband
returned from traveling and reported her missing. Her body was
found in the river by a fisherman that day. The police picked up
Simmons at school the next day; he'd apparently bragged to friends
that he'd killed Crook "because the bitch seen my face."14 In less
than two hours, Simmons, in tears, confessed and agreed to perform a reenactment of the crime.15
2. The courts. Prior to Simmons, the minimum age for execution
under the Eighth Amendment was sixteen. In 1988, in Thompson
v Oklahoma,16 a plurality of the Court had concluded that executing
individuals who had committed their crimes before the age of
sixteen constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the
12

125 S Ct at 1187-88; Brief for Respondent at *2 (cited in note 3). The prosecutor
does not attempt to resolve the question of which account explains Simmons's actions; in
his closing statement to the jury at the penalty phase, the prosecutor argued for the death
penalty with these words: "Do it because when he broke in Shirley Crook's home, and
she woke up, whatever his plans might have been before, something was solidified then,
she was going to die. She was going to die because he didn't want to take the responsibility."
T T a t 1158.
13

Id. The source for this quotation from Simmons is Brian Moomey (see note 11); T T
at 842. Moomey failed to use this "bitch seen my face" expression in his initial four- to
five-hour interview with the police—saying only that Simmons reported he had killed her
because "she seen my face"—and explaining this omission by saying that the police officers
had told him not to swear in front of them. T T at 864-69. As defense counsel drew out
at trial, Moomey swore multiple times in his initial interview. T T at 866-67.
13

Brief for Respondent *2 (cited in note 3) (noting that, in order to secure Simmons's
confession, the police "accused [Simmons] of lying, falsely told him [an accomplice] had
confessed, and explained that he might face the death penalty and that it would be in his
interest to cooperate").
487 US 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).

57

Eighth Amendment.17 The plurality based its conclusion on, first,
the "evolving standards of decency" reasoning, which looks principally to trends in state legislatures, as well as jury verdicts and
absolute numbers of executions, and, second, its own view that
executing those under the age of sixteen did not further the proper
purposes of the death penalty, because young people are not as
culpable and are unlikely to be deterred by a potential death sentence.18 Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, concluding
that although she thought there was a national consensus on the
matter, the evidence was insufficient to rule as such. Therefore,
she reasoned, a state legislature that wanted to permit executions
of those under sixteen had to make a clear statement to that effect,
and Oklahoma's legislature had not done so.19
The next year, the Court handed down two related decisions
on the same day. In Stanford v Kentucky,20 the Court declined to
extend the reasoning in Thompson to sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds, holding that no national consensus supported that extension.21 And in Penry v Lynaugh22 on similar grounds, the Court
held that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the execution
of offenders who are mentally retarded.23 Also relevant to our
inquiry, the Court nonetheless found Penry's death sentence unconstitutional, because Texas law did not allow the jury to consider
his mental retardation as a mitigating factor. The Court famously
referred to mental retardation as a "two-edged sword" for Penry:
"it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it
indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in
the future."24
In 2002, the Court partially overruled Penry in Atkins v Virginia2* concluding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing mentally retarded defendants. By this time, "standards of decency" had apparently "evolv[ed]" sufficiently—as indicated by the

125 S C t a t 1188.

14

16
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Id at 818, 838.
Id at 821-22, 824-25, 825 n 23.
19
Id at 848-49, 857-58.
20
492 US 361 (1989).
18

21

Id at 380.
492 US 302 (1989).
23
Id at 340.
24
Id at 324, 328.
25
536 US 304 (2002).

22
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national consensus—to persuade the Court.26 The Court also determined that in its own judgment, mental retardation sufficiently
affected culpability and deterrability to render the imposition of
the death penalty cruel and unusual.27
Inspired by Atkins, the Missouri Supreme Court in 2003 overturned Christopher Simmons's death sentence on the ground that
Atkins had effectively overruled Stanford—because of similar national trends and diminished culpability and deterrability—and
that it must therefore be unconstitutional to execute those who
committed their crimes when they were under the age of eighteen.28 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B. THE SIMMONS OPINIONS

1. "As every parent knows": Societal maturation and the special risks

of youth. Kennedy's opinion for the Court comes in two (and a
half) parts. First, the trend among states indicates that standards
of decency have evolved toward the conclusion that it is cruel and
unusual punishment to execute those who committed their crimes
before they turned eighteen.29 Second, youths are different enough
from adults to require a rule prohibiting their execution because
they cannot be reliably classed among society's worst offenders.30
As an avowed afternote, the Court adds that international law and
norms support its conclusion.31
The first part relies mainly on the trend among states, which
looks somewhat like the "telling" trend against executing people
with mental retardation observed in Atkins?2 As of 2005, thirty
states banned the juvenile death penalty, including eighteen that
specifically banned the juvenile death penalty and twelve that
banned the death penalty altogether; in 2002, at the time of Atkins,
the breakdown with regard to mental retardation had been precisely the same, including eighteen states expressly banning the
25

Id at 321.

27

Id at 320.

28

State ex rel Simmons v Roper, 112 SW3d 397, 399 (Mo 2003) (en bane).
125 S C t a t 1192-94.
30
Id at 1194-98.
29

31
32

Id at 1198-1200.
Id at 1193.
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death penalty for people with mental retardation and twelve with
an overall ban.33
The size of the recent shift toward banning was much greater
in Atkins, however, largely because in 1989 more states already
prohibited executing juvenile offenders than prohibited executing
people with mental retardation: After 1989, the number of states
banning executions of mentally retarded offenders increased from
two to eighteen, whereas the number banning the juvenile death
penalty increased from thirteen to eighteen.34 Because the trend
is not as strong as in Atkins, the Court makes much of the consistent direction of the trend.33 That is, no state had lowered the
age for death eligibility between 1989 and 2005.36 Quoting the
Missouri Supreme Court, the Court notes that it would be "ironic"
if the juvenile death penalty was deemed constitutional because
its impropriety had been recognized more widely sooner.37 The
Court does not address the fact that some states had enacted laws,
where none had previously existed, that permitted execution of
those younger than eighteen when they committed their crimes.38
The second part of the opinion focuses on three ways that juveniles differ from adults such that "juvenile offenders cannot with
reliability be classified as among the worst offenders,"39 those for
whom society's worst punishment is reserved. First, "as every parent knows," juveniles are comparatively immature, reckless, and
irresponsible.40 Second, juveniles are "more vulnerable and susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including
peer pressure," in part because juveniles, as legal minors, have less
control over their environments.41 Third, the character of juveniles
33

Id at 1192.
Id at 1193; see also note 175.
35
Id (citing Atkins, 536 US at 315 n 18).
34

36

Id.
Id at 1193-94 ("In the words of the Missouri Supreme Court: 'It would be the ultimate
in irony if the very fact that the inappropriateness of the death penalty for juveniles was
broadly recognized sooner than it was recognized for the mentally retarded were to become
a reason to continue the execution of juveniles now that the execution of the mentally
retarded has been barred.'" (quoting State ex rel Simmons v Roper, 112 SW3d 397, 408 n
10 (Mo 2003) (en bane))).
38
See 125 S Ct at 1220 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
37

3

"Idat 1195.
Id (citing these qualities as the reasons why juveniles may not "vot[e], servfe] on juries,
or marry[] without parental consent").
40

41

Id.
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is "not as well formed as that of an adult" and their "personality
traits" are "more transitory, less fixed."42 In addition to quoting
its own past language about the nature of youth, the Court cites
psychological literature on adolescent development and provides
appendices detailing state laws prohibiting juveniles (defined in
most cases as those under eighteen) from voting, serving on juries,
and marrying without parental consent.43 The Court concludes
that these three differences "render suspect any conclusion that a
juvenile falls among the worst offenders," because a juvenile's ongoing struggle to define his (or her) identity "means it is less
supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by
a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character."44
These differences indicate that "the penological justifications
for the death penalty"—retribution and deterrence—apply to juveniles "with lesser force than to adults."45 The Court says that
retribution isn't proportional if "the law's most severe penalty is
imposed on [those] whose culpability or blamewofthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity."46 And, the Court says, there is a lack of evidence to
show that juveniles are deterred by the death penalty.47 Indeed,
the same characteristics that make juveniles less culpable make
them less deferrable.48 For example, juveniles are unlikely to engage in cost-benefit analysis (the Court ignores Simmons's comment about getting away with it because they are juveniles).49 The
Court nonetheless gestures in the direction of imagining what a
young person's cost-benefit analysis might look like, noting that
life imprisonment may be a particularly harsh punishment for a
young offender, because more of life lies ahead.50

AGGRAVATING YOUTH
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The Court then entertains, without accepting, the argument
that "a rare case might arise in which a juvenile offender has
sufficient psychological maturity, and at the same time demonstrates sufficient depravity, to merit a sentence of death. "M Missouri argues that this possibility calls for an individualized determination by juries—properly guided to consider aggravating and
mitigating circumstances—rather than a "categorical rule."52
In a crucial passage, the Court responds that the risk is too great
that a "youthful person" would be put to death "despite insufficient
culpability."53 This risk apparently exists because, first, the "brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime" could overpower mitigating arguments, even where they should apply, and,
second, "a defendant's youth may even be counted against him."54
On this latter point, the Court invokes the prosecutor's argument
in this case that youth is aggravating.55 While acknowledging that
these problems could be corrected by a rule requiring juries to
attend to the mitigating force of youth, the Court mysteriously
asserts that this would not address the "larger concerns."56 The
Court then cites the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual's (DSMIV-TR) ban on diagnoses of antisocial personality disorders before
age eighteen as evidence that even experts cannot reliably pick out
the truly rotten individuals among those under age eighteen.57
Thus, "[w]hen a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the
State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but
the State cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a
mature understanding of his own humanity."58
The Court acknowledges that eighteen is not a perfect line; it
is merely a proxy.59 The Court concludes, though, that the logic
51

42

id.

43

Id; see notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
44
Id.
45
Id at 1196.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id ("In particular, as the plurality observed in Thompson, '[t]he likelihood that the
teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to
the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.'" (quoting Thompson
v Oklahoma, 487 US 815, 837 (1988) (plurality opinion))).
50
Id (arguing that "the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person").

61

Id at 1197.

52

Id.
"Id.
54
Id.
55

Id.

56

Id.
Id; see American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders 687, 702-06 (4th ed, text rev 2000) (hereafter "DSM-IV-TR") (defining diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder as including the following: "There is a
pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age
15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the [listed criteria.] The individual is at least
age 18 years").
57

58
59

125 S Ctat 1197.
Id at 1197-98; see text accompanying note 107.
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of Thompson extends to those up to age eighteen, the age at which
society draws many key distinctions between children and adults.60
The Court then reviews two problems with Stanford. First, the
Court in Stanford failed to count states with no death penalty as
states against the juvenile death penalty. Second, Stanford mistakenly deemed irrelevant the Court's "independent judgment" on
proportionality, in defiance of precedent.61
Finally, the Court dedicates a lengthy section to showing that
the international community supports its conclusion. Most notably, the Court observes that the "United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty."62 The Court explains, though, that international sources do not drive the decision, but "confirm [] our own
conclusions" about our Constitution.63
2. "Indefensibly arbitrary": The lack of consensus and the need for

individualized determinations. In dissent, Justice O'Connor argues
that there is not a "genuine national consensus," that the Court
does not even purport to find one, and that the Court's decision
therefore rests on its own moral-proportionality analysis.64
Though she agrees that the Constitution evolves in this area and
that the Court's own judgment matters, O'Connor disagrees with
the Court's independent judgment.65 Specifically, she objects to
the Court's use of a categorical proxy when the jury could decide
the relevance of youth on a case-by-case basis: "Adolescents as a
class are undoubtedly less mature, and therefore less culpable for
their misconduct, than adults. But the Court has adduced no evidence impeaching the seemingly reasonable conclusion reached
by many state legislatures: that at least some 17-year-old murderers
60

Id at 1198.
Id at 1192.
62
Id at 1198.
61

63

Id at 1198, 1200. Oddly, the Court never addresses the other question on which it
granted certiorari: whether the Missouri Supreme Court could treat Atkins as overruling
Stanford. See id at 1229 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
Justice Stevens writes separately, joined by Ginsburg, to highlight the principle that
"our understanding of the Constitution does change from time to time," to observe that
that principle "has been settled since John Marshall breathed life into its text," and to
note that if we followed the original meaning only, then states could execute seven-yearolds. Id at 1205 (Stevens, J, concurring). (More on the last from Scalia, but with less
apparent disapproval. See note 82 and accompanying text.)
64

Id at 1206 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).

65

Id at 1206-07 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
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are sufficiently mature to deserve the death penalty in an appropriate case."66 O'Connor focuses on the differences she sees between mental retardation and juvenile delinquency. In addition to
the difference in the state trends, she views mental retardation as
a perfect proxy for reduced culpability and deterrability, and youth
as only an imperfect one.67 And, she asserts, the Court has provided
no evidence that juries are incapable of assessing immaturity or
treating youth as mitigating.68
O'Connor gives several reasons for rejecting the Court's claim
that the differences between juveniles and adults support a categorical ban. First, the fact that juveniles are less culpable or deterrable does not mean that they are not sufficiently culpable or
deterrable to warrant the death penalty.69 There is an age that is
always too young in cognitive capacities, but that age is not the
cusp of adulthood.70 She invokes specific facts of the case, including
Simmons's reported comment that they could get away with the
crime because of their youth, to show that a juvenile offender may
be more "depraved" than the average murderer and may have the
capacity for at least an informal cost-benefit analysis.71
Second, relying on age is "indefensibly arbitrary" because there
is so much variation on both sides of the line.72 In contrast, the
category of mental retardation is ^defined by precisely the characteristics which render death an excessive punishment."73 Moreover, the Court in Atkins could and did "le[ave] to the State[s] the
task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional
restriction upon [their] execution of sentences."74 The failure of
the categorical rule, on this account, makes youth a perfect case
for the jury.
O'Connor concedes that the prosecutor's attempt to use Simmons's youth as an aggravating circumstance is "troubling," but
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id at 1206 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
Id at 1214 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
Id at 1215 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
Id at 1212-13 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
Id at 1213 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).

Id (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
Id at 1214 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
73
Id (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
74
Id at 1209 (O'Connor, J, dissenting) (quoting Atkins v Virginia, 536 U S 304, 317
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
72
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notes that, first, the prosecutor's statement wasn't "challenged with
specificity in the lower courts and is not directly at issue here";
second, the Court presents no evidence for its claim that juries
cannot weigh evidence of youth properly; and, third, the Court
"fails to explain why" youth is different from other qualitative
capital sentencing factors.75 Ultimately, she thinks youth is mitigating, and as a legislator she would be inclined to set the age at
eighteen, but thinks that inclination does not justify a categorical
ban under the Constitution.76
3. "Subjective views. . . and like mindedforeigners'": To the contrary.

Justice Scalia, joined in dissent by Rehnquist and Thomas, is predictably unimpressed by the argument that the Constitution's requirements can evolve within fifteen years, and also by the notion
that the Court may rely on its own judgment rather than waiting
for a firmer national consensus: "Because I do not believe that the
meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more than the meaning
of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by
the subjective views offiveMembers of this Court and like-minded
foreigners, I dissent."77
Scalia makes three main points: (1) there is no national consensus;78 (2) juvenile offenders sometimes warrant the death penalty;79 and (3) international law and norms should not matter.80
First, he begins his discussion of the national-consensus issue
by acknowledging, but disparaging as mistaken, the modern
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of looking to evolving standards.81 (He drops a footnote to mention that the Court skipped
the first step of the proper modern jurisprudence—i.e., whether
this was a mode of punishment considered cruel and unusual at
the nation's founding—and observes that at common law a seven7

'Id at 1215 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).

76

Id at 1217. O'Connor, like Scalia after her, actually addresses the other question for
certiorari, and devotes a short section to her indignation at Missouri's having taken upon
itself to overrule Stanford. Id at 1209-10. Unlike Scalia, she agrees with the Court that
international law can be relevant, though it cannot play a confirmatory role for her here
because she doesn't think there's a national consensus or a convincing moral-proportionality argument. Id at 1215-16.
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year-old could be executed, and there was a rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit a capital or other felony until age
fourteen.82) Then he contests the evidence of an adequate consensus here, highlighting (with O'Connor) that a few states that
had no age limit before Stanford expressly adopted sixteen as their
age limit since that case, and that Florida voters changed their
constitution to override their court's decision that executing juvenile offenders violated that constitution.83 He objects not only
to the specific numbers cited by the Court, but also to treating
states that lack the death penalty altogether as if they also must
think an exception should be made for juveniles where the death
penalty exists.84
In Scalia's view, a useful factor might instead be those states'
laws about treating juveniles as adults for noncapital crimes: All
those states without the death penalty at all (but for D.C. on life
imprisonment) permit juveniles to be tried as adults. Indeed, some
states actually require it for certain crimes. Thus, Scalia argues,
these states do not believe that juveniles should be exempted from
regular laws, or that they cannot be culpable in the way that adults
can.85 In general, since attitudes to the death penalty fluctuate over
time, Scalia perceives a real harm from the Court's fixing in place
one moment's view.86
Second, Scalia interprets the Court as implicitly saying that no
juvenile could ever be culpable and deterrable enough to deserve
the death penalty.87 He disparages both the Court's reliance on
its own view and the view itself, noting that the data on juvenile
capacity and development are contradictory (and weren't put to
the test of an adversarial process), and so evaluating these data is
a task for legislatures, not courts.88 He notes that in the context
of abortion, psychological data about the cognitive maturity of
juveniles have been offered to the Court as evidence that juveniles
82
83

11

84

78

85

Id at 1217 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
Id at 1217-21 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
79
Id at 1221-25 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
80
Id at 1225-29 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
81

Id at 1217 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
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Id at 1218 n 1 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
Id at 1220, 1220 n 6 (Scalia, J, dissenting); id at 1211 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
Id at 1218-19 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
Id at 1219 (Scalia, J, dissenting).

Id at 1220 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
Id at 1221 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
88
Id at 1222-23 (Scalia, J, dissenting).

87
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should be treated like adults.89 "In other words, all the Court has
done today, to borrow from another context, is to look over the
heads of the crowd and pick out its friends."90 Rejecting the analogy to marriage, jury service, or abortion, Scalia asserts that decisions such as these are surely more complicated than the decision
not to take a human life.91 And he details the facts of this case
and one of the terrible rape/murders described in Alabama's amicus brief to make the point that young people clearly can do
terrible things.92
No constitutional rule, he thus concludes, should prevent "legislatures and juries from treating exceptional cases in an exceptional way—by determining that some murders are not just the
acts of happy-go-lucky teenagers, but heinous crimes deserving of
death."93 Like O'Connor, Scalia is concerned about the Court's
distrust of juries and ponders the slippery slope: Why, for instance,
should juries be any better at properly considering the relevance
of child abuse as a mitigating factor?94 In addition,^ he finds no
reason to think that no juveniles are susceptible to deterrence, and
thus the Court's argument here must again depend on some mistaken absolute rule. Also like O'Connor, he cites the facts of this
case to show that some youths do consider deterrence-like factors,
and notes that the jury in this case may have considered Simmons's
calculation that he could get away with murder relevant to its
decision to impose the death penalty.95
Third, he believes that the Court must have taken "the so-called
international community" into account in its decision, or the
Court wouldn't have mentioned it at all.96 He cites the United
States's express reservation from the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights as evidence that either the United States
hasn't reached a national consensus, or it has reached the opposite
89
Id (Scalia, J, dissenting) (citing Brief for American Psychological Association as Amici
Curiae, Hodgson v Minnesota, 497 US 417 (1990) (Nos 88-805, 88-1125, 88-1309), 1989
WL 1127529).
90
91

Id at 1223 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
Id at 1224 (Scalia, J, dissenting).

92

Id at 1223-24 (Scalia, J, dissenting) (citing Brief for Alabama, et al, as Amici Curiae,
at 9-10, 2004 WL 865268).
93
Id at 1224 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
94
Id at 1225 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
9>
Id (Scalia, J, dissenting).
96

Id at 1225, 1229 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
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consensus as the international community.97 He also criticizes the
Court's apparent presumption that other countries, even horrible
dictatorships, really behave as they say.98 Here again he invokes
the slippery slope, asking whether we must also adopt other international norms. Should life imprisonment without parole not
be permitted for juveniles? Should there be less separation of
church and state?99
II. "SEVENTEEN YEARS OLD. ISN'T THAT SCARY?": THE
PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS

The crux of the Court's decision must be its proportionality
analysis, in particular, the diminished culpability discussion. Standing
by itself, the less-than-"telling" trend among states cannot easily support the Court's conclusion. Even though Kennedy resolves the Denominator Dispute in favor of counting anti-death-penalty states as
anti-juvenile-death-penalty (of which more later), the trend is hard
to characterize as proving a "genuine national consensus."100 Hence
the Court's decision cannot plausibly turn on this part of the analysis.
And, rightly or wrongly, the assertion that the death penalty could
not possibly deter sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds falls a bitflatin
a case in which the defendant reportedly urged hisfriendsto commit
murder by telling them they could get away with it because they
were juveniles.101 Finally, while international and comparative law
may have played a role in the Court's assessment of "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"102
that role was most plausibly to bolster rather than to supplant the
1
Court's "own judgment."5103
~
97

Id at 1225-26 (Scalia, J, dissenting).

98

Id at 1226 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
" I d at 1226-27. Scalia also notes his frustration that the Court did not admonish
Missouri for purporting to overrule Stanford. Presumably with more sarcasm than sympathy, he concludes, however, that the Missouri Supreme Court's decision was somewhat
understandable given that the Court's jurisprudence in this area makes it no longer the
expert on the Constitution. Id at 1229.
100
Id at 1206 (O'Connor, J, dissenting) ("Although the Court finds support for its
decision in the fact that a majority of the States now disallow capital punishment of 17year-old offenders, it refrains from asserting that its holding is compelled by a genuine
national consensus.").
101

See note 10.
Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
103
Roper v Simmons, 125 S Ct at 1191. The Court's recent invocations of international
and comparative law have received a great deal of attention. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland,
102
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A. AN ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE.''

While the dissenters agree that the crux of Kennedy's opinion
is the Court's own proportionality analysis, they overread that
opinion, disregarding both its opacity and its subtlety. Both
O'Connor and Scalia seem to read the majority as concluding that
all juveniles are insufficiently culpable to merit the death penalty.
O'Connor writes: "[T]he rule decreed by the Court rests, ultimately, on its independent moral judgment that death is a disproportionately severe punishment for any 17-year-old offender."104 Similarly, Scalia observes: "Of course, the real force
driving today's decision is not the actions of four state legislatures,
but the Court's 'own judgment' that murderers younger than 18
can never be as morally culpable as older counterparts."105
To be sure, this reading of the Court's opinion is not without
foundation. The opinion is evasive on whether juveniles are categorically different from adults and thus universally less culpable.
The best support for the dissenters' reading is this observation of
Kennedy's: "Certainly it can be argued, although we by no means
concede the point, that a rare case might arise in which a juvenile
offender has sufficient psychological maturity, and at the same time
Our International Constitution, 31 Yale J Int'l L 1 (2005) (examining the recent controversy
over the Court's use of international law in light of an extensive analysis of the Court's
long-standing practice of invoking international law). Though not a focus of my article,
a few words follow on the subject. The phrase "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society" seems to embrace a kind of Whiggish progress narrative
in which we are becoming ever more decent over time. And while the question of which
way progress lies seems indeterminate, discussions of the juvenile death penalty often seem
to assume we know what progress looks like. Rather tellingly, the brief on behalf of
Missouri—whose task is of course to convince the Court that evolving standards of decency
do not preclude the juvenile death penalty—asserts that we do not "yet" have a national
consensus on this point. Brief for Petitioner at *21-*22, Roper v Simmons, 125 S Ct 1183
(2005) (No 03-633), 2004 WL 903158; see notes 197-98 and accompanying text (quoting
and discussing the relevant passage). The doctrinal metaphors of that progress narrative—
evolution and maturation—may help to explain why international standards might seem
relevant to the determination of our national standards of decency. Constructivist work
by historians of age and of science notwithstanding, see notes 168-69 and accompanying
text, we tend to think of evolution and maturation as natural processes. These metaphors
therefore naturalize the progress narrative, helping to remove it from the realm of cultural
difference and specificity, into a realm of inevitable and universal progress or growing up.
Under this account, the "progress" of other nations toward a near-consensus on the juvenile
death penalty must help to demonstrate, or to confirm (to take Kennedy at his word), that
the Court's own judgment is right, that the states that have moved in this direction are
right, and that the states that haven't outlawed the juvenile death penalty just haven't
quite gotten there yet and need to be nudged along.
104

125 S Ct at 1206 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).

103

Id at 1221 (Scalia, J, dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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demonstrates sufficient depravity, to merit a sentence of death."106
Kennedy refuses to concede that an individual juvenile might deserve the death penalty, but this is not an argument against the
proposition.
Moreover, Kennedy later seems to admit the point:
Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the
objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities
that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an
individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have
already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.
For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be
drawn.107
Kennedy here seems to acknowledge that youth is an imperfect
proxy for diminished culpability, suggesting that his earlier comment may simply reflect an unwillingness to concede expressly a
quasi-empirical point that makes his conclusion harder to defend.
B. OF STEREOTYPES AND INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENTS

Kennedy's opinion consists of a batch of generalizations—of
stereotypes, in the pejorative language of antidiscrimination law—
about juveniles. O'Connor's argument, perhaps unsurprisingly in
light of her particularistic approach to constitutional law, instead
emphasizes the need for case-by-case assessment:108 Because youth
is an imperfect proxy for diminished culpability, she reasons, the
jury should determine in each case whether a particular individual's
age mitigates his culpability. Unlike, for example, voting, where
the alternatives to a blanket age-based rule would be costly and
possibly invidious, death-penalty sentencing determinations always already demand individualized inquiries.109 Declining the
proxy in favor of an inquiry into the thing itself should therefore
create little additional cost and no new harms in criminal sentencing. At first glance, then, O'Connor reasonably argues that
the question of diminished culpability on account of youth should
be answered by juries in individual cases.
106

Id at 1197.
Id at 1197-98.
108
Cf., e.g., Gratz v Bollinger, 539 US 244, 280 (2003) (O'Connor, J, concurring); Grutter
v Bollinger, 539 US 306, 335-37 (2003) (O'Connor, J).
107

109

125 S C t a t 1216.
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Kennedy's generalizations about youth have also been criticized
by a surprising source: proponents of youth liberation.110 Advocates of children's rights split into two main camps: protectionists
and liberationists.111 Protectionists emphasize the special vulnerability of minors in order to argue for a solicitous state; liberationists, who trace their roots to mid-twentieth-century civil rights
movements centered upon race and sex, seek autonomy and selfdetermination for young people.112 Though at times adopting
more familiar terms like ageism and age discrimination, which tend
to evoke the struggles of older people, youth libbers have also
coined more colorful terms like ephebiphobia—fear of youth—and
adultism or adultocracy } n Though their normative goals are unlikely to capture the imagination of many adults,114 youth liber110
See, e.g., Mike Males, Statistical
youthtoday/Apr05/males.html (Apr 5,
Strikes Down Juvenile Death Penalty,
youth_rights/ (Mar 1, 2005); id (posted

Bigotry, available at http://www.youthtoday.org/
2005); Alex Koroknay-Palicz, Supreme Court
available at http://www.oneandfour.org/archives/
comments).
'

111
Rosalind Ekman Ladd, Introduction, in Rosalind Ekman Ladd, ed, Children's Rights
Re-visioned: Philosophical Readings 1, 2 (1996).
112
See, e.g., id; Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to
Children's Rights, in Children's Rights Re-visioned at 42, 48 (cited in note 111).
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ation arguments—whether academic philosophy or weblog
posts—make some insightful points about the status of young people and draw intriguing parallels to subordination based on other
traits. No less than Justice O'Connor, liberationists oppose generalizations about youth and plead for individualized judgments.
A rallying cry of this work is that stereotyping about youth
artificially distinguishes individuals based on age and hinders the
development and autonomy of young people.115 Some youth liberation writing takes the point a step further, arguing that agebased classifications limit young people and adults, by pressing
conformity and lifelessness on adults in the name of being "grown
up."116 Reminiscent of radical strands of feminist and queer politics, this form of youth liberation argument rallies around youthfulness, which it attempts to denaturalize, rather than around chronologically young age.117
But the central youth liberation critique focuses on the subordination of young people by adults, who control and stereotype
them, in part through overbroad generalizations. In the words of
a youth liberation classic, "By now I have come to feel that the
fact of being a 'child,' of being wholly subservient and dependent,

113

For example, National Youth Rights Association, Ephebiphobia, in The Freechild Project's Survey of North American Youth Rights, available at http://www.freechild.org/
SNAYR/Ephebiphobia.htm. ("Ephebiphobia is denned as the fear of youth. This fear is
generally based in negative stereotypes of youth, and is perpetuated by popular media
(news, tv, movies) around the world. Ephebiphobia often leads to Adultism, at its worst
perpetuating the alienation of young people from society."); Mike Males, The New Demons:
Ordinary Teens, LA Times (Apr 21, 2002) ("Ephebiphobia—extreme fear of youth—is a
full-blown media panic. Images of 'ordinary' teenagers besieging grown-up havens are
everywhere. . . . Today's ephebiphobia is the latest installment of a history of bogus moral
panics targeting unpopular subgroups to obscure an unsettling reality: Our worst social
crisis is middle-Americans['] own misdirected fear."); Brian A. Dominick, Revolution Kid
Style, in Liberating Youth (2d ed 1997) (with Sara Zia), available at http://www.zmag.org/
0009.htm ("[Y]oung people must learn that adults are not what is to be fought. Instead,
the ideological construct that is adultocracy must be contended with. . . . For the youth
liberation movement, adultocracy is the chief adversary. Its agents, we must remember,
are not only adults but also other young people who have internalized notions of the
adult/child dichotomy and thus perpetuate disruption of class consciousness. . . . How
often do we see kids who feel worthless because they are kids? And who abuse those kids
who do not feel worthless as such? If we did not oppress ourselves so efficiently, we would
be able to rise up and fight in unity. But alas, we cannot, because we are too busy incorporating ageism into our daily lives.").
114
See, e.g., John Holt, Escape from Childhood 18-19 (1974) (proposing that "the rights,
privileges, duties, and responsibilities of adult citizens be made available to any young person,
of whatever age, who wants to make use of them" and expressly "not sayfing] that these rights
and duties should be tied into one package, that if a young person wants to assume any of them
he must assume them all. He should be able to pick and choose . . . ."); John Harris, The
Political Status of Children, in Keith Graham, ed, Contemporary Political Philosophy: Radical Studies
35,49-51 (1982) (suggesting that we should move toward granting children "full political status"

from the age of ten); Dominick (cited in note 113) (arguing for youth liberation as a means to
egalitarian anarchy); see also Judith Hughes, The Philosopher's Child, in Children's Rights Revisioned at 15, 20—22 (cited in note 111) (noting that Holt and Harris do not adequately address
the practical challenges of their proposals).
113
See, e.g., Holt at 25-26 (cited in note 114) (describing "the institution of childhood"
as "a Great Divide in human life" that has "made us think that the people on opposite
sides of this divide, the Children and the Adults, are very different. Thus we act as if the
differences between any sixteen-year-old and any twenty-two-year-old were far greater
and more important than the differences between someone aged two and someone aged
sixteen, or between someone aged twenty-two and someone aged seventy. . . . In short,
by the institution of childhood I mean all those attitudes and feelings, and also customs
and laws, that . . . make it difficult or impossible for young people to make contact with
the larger society around them, and, even more, to play any kind of active, responsible,
useful part in it . . . .").
116
See, e.g., Brian A. Dominick and Sara Zia, Young and Oppressed, in Liberating Youth
(Behind Enemy Lines Publications, 1996), available at http://www.zmag.org/0009.htm
("Adults are expected to act 'grown up.' As their youth has been all but entirely eradicated,
this is not a very high expectation. Being 'grown up' means discarding all curiosity, creativity and sense of adventure.").
117
Dominick and Zia (cited in note 116) ("Youth is not necessarily possessed only by
those who are young in age. It is a state of mind which can be attained by anyone, was
once possessed by everyone, but is rarely present in anyone beyond adolescence."); see
also Brian A. Dominick, Introduction, in Liberating Youth (cited in note 113) (explaining,
in a new introduction to the pamphlet containing the Dominick and Zia article, that the
article was originally written when the authors were seventeen and twenty, and that although the authors are now twenty and twenty-three, and "getting older all the time,. . .
we both attest to feeling youthful, which is what counts. . . .").
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of being seen by older people as a mixture of expensive nuisance,
slave, and super-pet, does most young people more harm than
good."118 It is in this vein that youth libbers such as Alex KoroknayPalicz criticize Kennedy's opinion in Simmons for "the argument
that youth are mentally deficient and cannot be compared to
adults."119 More dramatically, Mike Males accuses Kennedy of
"endorsing] ugly, long-debunked 'biodeterminism' prejudices
against adolescents that menace the fundamental rights of young
people."120
C. AGE-BASED DISCRIMINATION? SIMMONS AS A PROPHYLACTIC RULE

The youth libbers' criticism, like O'Connor's, fails to recognize
the curious antidiscrimination rationale that underlies Kennedy's
reasoning, a rationale that comes in several steps. First, Kennedy
is indeed saying that age-based classifications are rational, that is,
they track certain traits relevant to culpability. On Kennedy's account, juveniles as a class are less responsible and more reckless,
more susceptible to influence,121 and less formed in their characters. Kennedy's account of how these characteristics of juveniles
mitigate their culpability is skeletal, but the article from which
Kennedy apparently draws this tripartite structure pairs each ju118

Holt at 18 (cited in note 114).

119

Koroknay-Palicz (cited in note 110); see also id (criticizing Kennedy's first point
about juveniles as reckless as follows: "This argument enshrined in a SCOTUS decision
is a dangerous foe of any possible judicial progress for youth rights. I dispute the validity
of the scientific evidence cited, and am bothered by the casual 'as any parent knows'
language. No doubt Justice Kennedy draws upon the long standing precedents of 'as
every husband knows' and 'as every white person knows' to build this particular case
against youth. . . .").
120
121

Males, Statistical Bigotry (cited in note 110).

Interestingly, this point brings together two quite different contributing factors to
vulnerability: juveniles' being easily influenced because they are constrained by their environment and lack of societal autonomy, and their being so influenced because of the
impressionability of this developmental stage. The Court quotes a sentence from Laurence
Steinberg and Elizabeth Scott on this point—"[A]s legal minors, [juveniles] lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting" (see note 122,
at 1014)—for which Steinberg and Scott in turn cite Jeffrey Fagan, Contexts of Choice by
Adolescents in Criminal Events, in Thomas Grisso and Robert G. Schwartz, eds, Youth on
Trial: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice 371 (2000). 125 S Ct at 1195. Rather
than discussing the constraining role of law, however, Fagan may best be read to be
discussing the ways that the real threat of violence for "adolescents in dangerous, potentially lethal contexts" may constrain choices by making violence rational. Fagan at 389.
Regardless of source, Koroknay-Palicz notes with some optimism the Court's seeming
reference to the coercive circumstances of law as a youth rights argument. See KoroknayPalicz (cited in note 110).
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venile trait with traditional bases for mitigation: (1) diminished
capacity (paired with lesser decision-making abilities); (2) duress,
provocation, or coercion (greater vulnerability to coercive circumstances); and (3) the lack of bad character (juveniles' unformed
character).122
Second, Kennedy asserts that, despite being "marked and well
understood," these differences between juveniles and adults cannot
be left to juries to discern and take into account.123 This objection
lies at the heart of his opinion. O'Connor responds that Kennedy
does not sufficiently explain why juries cannot be trusted with
these decisions.124 But Kennedy's reasoning supplies an answer,
one both fascinating and subtle.
Kennedy suggests that juries are too likely to get it wrong, for
reasons similar to those that prompt prophylactic antidiscrimination rules in other contexts. His answer to O'Connor's question—Why not let juries make individualized determinations
about the mitigating effect of age?—is more illustrative than deductive, and requires some elaboration. Kennedy presents two reasons why the risk is too great that juries will fail properly to treat
youth as mitigating: one more cognitive, and one more emotional,
though the distinction is of course inexact. (This distinction might
be analogized to the distinction in social psychology between stereotypes and attitudes.125) In other words, Kennedy is concerned
that jurors will err because identifying accurately the cases in which
youth mitigates an individual's culpability is such a difficult cognitive task. He also fears that jurors' emotions may prevent them
from properly exercising their rational capacities and at times cause
them to disfavor those whom they should favor.
The cognitive reason is embedded in Kennedy's discussion of
antisocial personality disorder, which, according to the DSM-IV122
Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am
Psychologist 1009, 1016 (2003); see 125 S Ct at 1195-97.
125
125 S Ct at 1197 (noting "[a]n unacceptable likelihood" that the jury would err).
124
Id at 1212 (O'Connor, J, concurring) ("[T]he Court adduces no evidence whatsoever
in support of its sweeping conclusion.").
125
For example, Becca R. Levy and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Ageism, in Todd D.
Nelson, ed, Ageism: Stereotyping and Prejudice Against Older Persons 49, 51 (MIT Press,
2002) (distinguishing, in a discussion of implicit attitudes toward old age, "implicit age
stereotypes (also called automatic or unconscious stereotypes)" from "implicit age attitudes
(also called automatic or unconscious prejudice)").
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TR, psychiatrists may not diagnose in those under age eighteen.126
The reason, Kennedy observes, is that it is too difficult to figure
out which young people are bad to the core and which are still
changing and could improve. In Kennedy's words, "It is difficult
even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption."127
The meaning here is not entirely clear, but Kennedy seems to
suggest two overlapping possibilities: (1) it is hard to tell which
young people will not be bad forever because they will improve
as they grow older; and (2) it is hard to tell which young people
will not be bad forever because their youth itself causes them to
commit bad acts. I will return to these points shortly, but for now
it is worth noting that Kennedy's observation seems to implicate
both ideas. The key point here is that if experts do not have the
ability to determine accurately whether a juvenile offender is
among the worst of the worst, then surely juries will not be able
to draw the distinctions O'Connor wants them to make.
This explanation seems unsatisfying, though, in light of Kennedy's earlier assertion that the characteristics that mitigate
youths' culpability are "marked and well understood"; if this is so,
why not trust juries to err on the side of mitigating? This question
brings me to Kennedy's other and more fundamental reason for
rejecting O'Connor's individualized approach.
Features of juvenile death penalty cases in general, and this case
in particular, Kennedy reasons, suggest that jurors' feelings about
the crime and the criminal may render them incapable of properly
making these individualized determinations of the mitigating force
of age. This argument comes in two parts. First, the vicious nature
of the crimes that render someone eligible for the death penalty
may cause jurors to underestimate the mitigating force of youth.128
Kennedy may be thinking of his own reaction to the Alabama
amicus brief, which describes in excruciating detail several hor126
127

See note 57 and accompanying text.

125 S Ct at 1197 (citing DSM-IV-TR at 701-06 (cited in note 57)); Steinberg and
Scott at 1014-16 (cited in note 122).
128
125SCtatll97 ("An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded
nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as
a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability,
and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.").
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rendous crimes committed by juveniles, and which he described
at oral argument as "chilling."129 But this fails to explain why juries
would be any worse at making determinations of the mitigating
force of youth than of any other mitigating factor in heinous death
penalty cases. Perhaps Kennedy thinks that it is particularly difficult for juries to see the perpetrator of heinous acts as young,
because, for instance, juries expect youth to be a time of innocence.130 Although this might distinguish youth from other mitigating factors that juries must consider, and thus may respond to
Scalia's and O'Connor's criticism, Kennedy does not directly suggest that this is his reasoning. More is needed, and this brings us
to a crucial moment.
Kennedy tells us that juries may consider youth as the opposite
of mitigating: as aggravating. "In some cases a defendant's youth
may even be counted against him. In this very case, . . . the prosecutor argued Simmons' youth was aggravating rather than mitigating."131 As noted earlier, at the penalty phase, the prosecutor
argued,132
Let's look at the mitigating circumstances. . . . Age, he says.
Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary? Doesn't
that scare you?
Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite
the contrary.133
This argument was not unique to Simmons; an article cited in
Simmons's brief catalogues similar prosecutorial rhetoric in trials
in other jurisdictions.134
12y
Oral Argument at *33 (cited in note 3) ("Well, there were a number—a number of
cases in the Alabama amicus brief, which is chilling reading—and I wish that all the people
that sign on to the amicus briefs had at least read that before they sign on to them—
indicates that often the 17-year-old is the ringleader." (quoting Kennedy, J)).
130
A prosecutorial argument from another case, the trial of Scott Hain, seems to rely
on this logic. See text accompanying note 166.
131

125 S C t a t 1197.
At oral argument Scalia proposed that these lines did not amount to an argument
that youth was aggravating, only that it was not mitigating; he criticized the Missouri
solicitor for "giv[ing] that one away." Oral Argument at *10-*ll (cited in note 3). But
Kennedy at oral argument and in the opinion, as well as the others who spoke on the
matter at oral argument, clearly reads this as a suggestion that youth is aggravating, and
prosecutors in other jurisdictions have made the point even more plainly. See, e.g., Ashley
Dobbs, The Use of Youth as an Aggravating Factor in Death Penalty Cases Involving Minors,
10 Juvenile Justice Update (June/July 2004), at 1, 15; note 138 and accompanying text.
132

133

TT at 1156-57.
Dobbs at 15 (cited in note 132) (cataloguing seven other such instances, the trial
transcripts of which are quoted below); Brief for Respondent at *30 (cited in note 3).
134
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Why would prosecutors think—and why would Kennedy
agree—that this argument could persuade jurors? And so much
so that even a rule requiring juries to consider youth as mitigating
would not address Kennedy's "larger concerns"?135 Something in
this argument extends beyond its articulation by any particular
prosecutor. That is, the argument has force because its underlying
logic already exists in the public consciousness and therefore resonates with jurors; it is available to jurors whether a prosecutor
argues it or not. And something in it threatens to derail a juror's
impartial and appropriate individualized consideration of youth in
the death penalty context.
One might think the prosecutor means that youth is scary because the juvenile offender will be alive longer and therefore have
more time to commit future crimes, even if only in prison. This
sort of argument—that youth allows more time for future dangerousness—seems to drive the youth-as-aggravating argument
made by a Texas prosecutor in another recent juvenile death penalty case: "Just shows he's got that much longer to be bad and
prey on others who are weak, who are helpless, who are alone."136
Relatedly, prosecutors may present young offenders as especially
dangerous by implying that they will be even larger, stronger, and
scarier in the future. For example, another Texas prosecutor argued, "He's got a[n] onset of violence at 17 years of age. He's just
now going into the violent period. You want to talk about a future
forecast of dangerousness? What is the highest risk—what is the
highest risk in terms of a time period? Where is it? 17 to 26. . . .
What do you think we've got to look forward to in the next eight
years?"137 Another prosecutor, after reciting the horrific things
done in prison by a defendant who was seventeen at the time of
his crime, said, "And they want to tell you that because of his age
that's mitigating? Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if he's this
mean at age 18, he's going to be something in a couple of years.
135

125 S Ct at 1197.

136

Closing argument transcript at 32-92, Guillen v State, No 73,491 (Tex Crim App
2003) (quoting Mr. Barnes); see also Dobbs at 15 (cited in note 132) (noting the name
and geographic location of the prosecutor).
137
Closing argument transcript at 931-32, Beazley v State, No 72,101 (Tex Crim App
1997) (quoting Jack Skeen, Jr., Smith County District Attorney); see also Dobbs at 15
(cited in note 132) (reporting the name of the prosecutor and the fact that Napoleon
Beazley was executed on May 28, 2002).
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That's not mitigating at all. If[] anything it's aggravating."138
This idea of future dangerousness might be present in Simmons's case, as the court below observed.139 But the prosecutor's
invitation to the jury to "think about age" and his comment, "Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary?" seem not only to suggest prediction, but to imply that Simmons's youth made him more culpable.140
The prosecutor seems to be intimating that for a person to do
such bad things when young must mean the person is really bad.
That is, a youth who is capable of committing such horrific acts
must be monstrous, or evil, or genetically defective.141 Such a
person must be off the charts of humanity, such that society is
absolved of responsibility for either creating him or reforming
him—indeed, even for allowing him to live. This argument appeals
to a prosecutor, because it may help jurors wash their hands of
this defendant and help them overcome any feeling of human
sympathy, any sense of collective responsibility, for such a person.
Moreover, it supplies a reason to view this individual as among
the worst of the worst and therefore deserving of society's worst
punishment.142 To draw on language from another context, we
might call this a minoritizing view of aggravating youth.143
On the other hand, the prosecutor's words may evoke something
broader about teenagers. Taken alone, the words "Think about
age. Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary?" resonate more generally. There is something scary about adolescents.144 The qualities
138
Closing argument transcript at 118-19, Jones v State, No 72,500 (Tex Crim App 1999)
(quoting Assistant County Attorney Kerye Ashmore); see also Dobbs at 15 (cited in note
132) (providing the prosecutor's name and reporting Jones's age).
139
State ex rel Simmons v Roper, 112 SW3d 397, 413 (Mo 2003) (en bane) ("Thus, Mr.
Simmons' youth was used to suggest greater immorality and future dangerousness and so
to provide a further reason to impose the death penalty." (emphasis added)).
140
Cf. also id ("Thus, Mr. Simmons' youth was used to suggest greater immorality and
future dangerousness and so to provide a further reason to impose the death penalty."
(emphasis added)).
141
Cf., e.g., Joe L. Kincheloe, The New Childhood: Home Alone as a Way of Life, in Henry
Jenkins, ed, The Children's Culture Reader 159, 164 (1998) ("[T]he appearance of evil so
close to goodness and innocence [makes] the child monster that much more horrible").
142
Cf. note 163 (quoting from work representative of the superpredator panic of the
1990s).
143
Cf. E v e K o s o f s k y S e d g w i c k , Epistemology of the Closet 85 (1990) (defining a m i n o r i tizing view of homosexuality as the view that "there is a distinct population of persons
who 'really are' gay").
144
Stanley Hall, author of a historic two-volume work on the subject, is typically credited
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of youth Kennedy describes—immature and reckless, easily influenced, and lacking in determinate character—can be frightening.
Moreover, sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds—the group at issue in
this case—present a special threat: they are on the verge of adulthood, with physical strength and other capacities that approximate
adults', but, by most accounts, they lack adults' self-control or
other-regardingness.145 As Kennedy has implied by suggesting that
some juvenile offenders will grow out of their criminality because
adolescence itself causes their criminal behavior,146 seventeen is a
scary age. Indeed, more than one psychological tradition characterizes adolescence as akin to mental illness.147 This we might
call a universalizing view of youth as aggravating.148
These notions of youth as aggravating may shape jurors' willingness—indeed, their ability—to identify with an offender, diwith the popularization, if not the invention, of the concept of adolescence as a distinct
period between puberty and adulthood. See generally G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence (1924);
see also, e.g., Arlene Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development
and Social Context, 39 L & Contemp Probs 38, 62 (1975).
14>

See Skolnick at 62 (cited in note 144).

146

See text accompanying note 127; see also Steinberg and Scott at 1015 (cited in note
122) ("Adolescent traits that contribute to criminal conduct are normative in adolescence,
but they are not typical of adulthood."); cf. Males, Statistical Bigotry (cited in note 110)
(arguing that the arguments on both sides in Simmons "could be summed up as, 'Our
teens: willfully cold-blooded killers, or helplessly deranged psychopaths?'").
14/
See, e.g., Leslie A. Zebrowitz and Joann M. Montepare, "7oo Young, Too Old": Stigmatizing Adolescents and Elders, in Todd F. Heatherton, et al, eds, The Social Psychology of
Stigma 334, 340-41 (2000) (quoting Anna Freud as claiming that "[t]he adolescent manifestations come close to symptom formation of the neurotic, psychotic or dissocial disorder"). Childhood, with its unmediated expression of feeling and desire, also bears a long
tradition of analogies to madness. See, e.g., Adam Phillips, Going Sane 93 (2005) ("Our
earliest lives are lived in a state of sane madness—of intense feelings and fearfully acute
sensations."). The analogy to mental illness is an interesting one, particularly in light of
current efforts by some death penalty advocates to press for a rule prohibiting the death
penalty for people who were "insane" at the time of their crimes. (The Court has already
held that people cannot be executed when they are insane. Ford v Wainwright, 477 US
399, 401 (1986).) I do not develop the analogy here, but one interesting point of contrast
concerns the complexity of attitudes in each area. As I discuss, part of what makes youth
complicated is the combination of pervasive positive and negative attitudes. The reason
that a prosecutor could say that a young person who commits terrible acts isn't really
"childlike," see text accompanying note 166, is the background set of assumed characteristics of youth that are highly favorable, such as innocence and vulnerability. By contrast,
though attitudes to mental illness are complicated, there is no compensating set of favorable
attitudes that would make cognizable the statement by a prosecutor that a mentally ill
person who does something bad couldn't possibly be mentally ill because mentally ill
people are too good for such things. There may be some competing idea that mentally
ill people are vulnerable and deserve state solicitude, but no highly positive set of ascriptions akin to those about youth.
148

Cf. Sedgwick at 85 (cited in note 143) (defining a universalizing view of homosexuality
as the view "that apparently heterosexual persons and object choices are strongly marked
by same-sex influences and desires, and vice versa for apparently homosexual ones").
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rectly or indirectly. In Simmons's trial, as in any other, there is
more than one possible point of identification. One might identify
with the victim, seeing the story through her eyes, as O'Connor
seems to do, when she writes of "the terror that this woman must
have suffered throughout the ordeal leading to her death."149
Though jurors might be unlikely to identify with Simmons, they
might identify with him indirectly, seeing the event through his
parents' eyes. This was certainly true for some of the prospective
jurors who never made it onto the jury. Most notable among these
was venireman Dombrowski, who had a son the age of Chris
Simmons, and who thought it would be hard to consider the death
penalty in the abstract after seeing Simmons and thinking of his
own son.150 In his words, "The only uncomfortable feeling I have
presently is looking at the young man, and perhaps blinking once
or twice, and perhaps seeing your son's face there."151 His image
of blinking and seeing his own child was echoed by another prospective juror, who said she had "grand kids that age, and like one
gentleman said, yesterday, you bat your eyes a couple times, and
open them and see your grandson sitting there."1'2
This kind of familial identification with youth is a reason that
youth might seem not to need special protection, just as old age
might seem not to need protecting.153 This distinguishes age-based
differences from racial differences, for instance. In addition to
having been that age once, we all, or most all of us, have relatives
that age. Many of us have children that age. We can therefore in
theory empathize with a young defendant's position.
Of course, similar arguments have been made about women,
and there we have seen that familial identification and an associated desire to protect do not necessarily lead to fair treatment.
Moreover, parental identification can cut both ways. Just as parents
can adore, admire, and identify with their children, they can also
149

125 S Ct at 1213 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
150 YY at 216 ("I have a son approximately his age, and earlier we were asked to render
our attitude, and I would think it would be difficult knowing his parents were somewhere
waiting for us to make a decision, and trying to equate that with my son in perhaps a
similar situation. I agree it would be difficult. It could be done, but that would be my
attitude."); id at 292 ("Sitting here and seeing the young man there brings out our—
whatever deeper biases, or unbiases we may have.").
151

Id at 293.
Id at 472 (quoting venireman Wright).
153
But see text Part IV.
152
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resent, envy, and isolate them.1'4 And now, when children are typically a financial drain on the family, Viviana Zelizer has argued
their value to a family is principally emotional.1" If children are
expected to give back, in exchange for years of financial support,
emotional benefits, what happens when they do not supply that
value in exchange?
As the prosecutor stated to the jury, echoing his question about
the scariness of Simmons's youth, "Look at what his friends and
family told you. Isn't that scary? Look at how he repaid their love.
. . . Show some mercy to his family, give him death."156 That is, isn't
it scary that Simmons could repay his family for their generosity by
committing this heinous crime, putting them through this horrible
ordeal, and making them a part of such an atrocity?
Similarly, outrage at the betrayal of parental goodwill seems to
fuel the anger inspired by statements, in this case and others, that
the young offender thought age would let him off the hook: for
instance, Simmons's supposedly telling his friends that they could
get away with the crime because they are juveniles,157 or a seventeenyear-old offender in Texas who announced when he was caught,
"I'm a juvenile, you can't do anything to me."158 Prosecutors relish
154
Cf., e.g., Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, A Poem Is Being Written, in Tendencies 177, 198-99
(1993) ("There is always a potential for a terrifying involuntarity of meaning, in the body
of a child."); Steven Mintz, Huck's Raft: A History ofAmerican Childhood 2-3 (2004) ("Americans are deeply ambivalent about children. Adults envy young people their youth, vitality,
and physical attractiveness. But they also resent children's intrusions on their time and
resources and frequently fear their passions and drives. Many of the reforms that nominally
have been designed to protect and assist the young were also instituted to insulate adults
from children.").
153
See Viviana A. Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child passim, 11 (1985) (arguing that the
children's expulsion from the market at the turn of the last century was coupled with a
"sacralization" of children's lives centered on their sentimental value). Zelizer concludes
the study by considering whether 1980s America was witnessing a return to any greater
interest in the economic usefulness of children to their families; noting the need for more
research, she observes, "The notion, inherited from the early part of this century, that
there is a necessarily negative correlation between the emotional and utilitarian value of
children is being revised." Id at 227. As Zelizer describes it, though, any such shift seems
to involve adding a financial element to the familial expectations of children's emotional
contributions, rather than reducing their expected emotional contribution: "The sentimental value of children may now include a new appreciation of their instrumental worth."
Id (noting the need, however, for more research on the lives of children, particularly those
living in poverty and in single-parent families).

i>6 '-pf a t j ]57 cf t e x t accompanying note 133 (quoting the longer passage containing
the words, "Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary?").
157
See note 10 and accompanying text.
158
Closing argument transcript, Guillen at 32-92 (cited in note 136) (quotingMr. Barnes)
(raising this quotation in the same paragraph in which he argued that Guillen's youth
should be aggravating rather than mitigating, see text accompanying note 136).
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the chance to remind juries of such quotes at the sentencing phase,
perhaps because they strike a particular chord for adults. By arrogantly invoking their youth, these young offenders seem to pay back
our generosity, our willingness to come down easy on them, by
turning our generosity into an excuse for their mistreatment of us.
(Curiously, the arguments of the young offenders—that they will
be protected by their youth from punishment—sound rather like
the pro-youth-punishment arguments that conflate mitigation and
excuse.159) The double-edged nature of parent-child reciprocity may
further explain how youth could be understood as aggravating.
Kennedy finds this sort of prosecutorial argument or juror reasoning unacceptable. He worries that jurors will be inflamed against
young offenders, will use their youth in exactly the wrong way
(against them rather than for them), and will therefore fail at the
difficult task of reliably distinguishing the truly incorrigible from
the reparable teenagers. To avoid these errors, we must instantiate
into law one generalization—of teens as less mature and therefore
less culpable—to combat the potential use of another, less acceptable
generalization—of teen offenders as particularly scary predators deserving of harsher punishment on account of their adolescence.
D. THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM

But why does Kennedy—and O'Connor and apparently others
at oral argument—deem the treatment of youth as aggravating to
be patently unacceptable (and perhaps even shocking)? One wonders why such treatment is illicit. Indeed, the constitutional status
of such arguments is unclear: In a series of decisions since the
early '80s, the Court has drifted toward and away (and back toward
again) finding an Eighth Amendment or due process violation in
the consideration of a mitigating factor as aggravating, but no
holding conclusively resolves the issue.160 (O'Connor may have
159
Cf. Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 Tex L Rev 799,
800 (2003) (criticizing the common conflation of excuse and mitigation and arguing that
youth should be mitigating but not a basis for excuse).
160

See, e.g., Penry v Lynaugh, 492 US 302, 328 (1989); Johnson v Texas, 509 US 350,
372-73 (1993); Graham v Collins, 506 US 461, 475-76 (1993); Penry v Johnson, 532 US
782, 804 (2001) ("Penry II"); Tennard v Dretke, 542 US 274, 288-89 (2004); see also Zant
v Stephens, 462 US 862, 885 (1983) (stating in dicta that if the state had "attached the
'aggravating' label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant
to the sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of
the defendant, or to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty, such
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cause for frustration with Kennedy here, since they have been on
opposite sides of this issue in a number of cases, most notably in

Johnson v Texas.,161)

1. Race. One cause for concern—though there is no indication
that this was Kennedy's concern—might be the potential role of
race in determining whether youth is deemed aggravating rather
than mitigating. Some research suggests that race influences
whether probation officers attribute juvenile criminality to internal
factors such as attitude and personality rather than to external
factors such as social environment, and race affects their predictions of future dangerousness and sentence recommendations.162
If criminality is more likely to be deemed a personality trait of
African-American juvenile offenders, then their youth would be
less likely to be deemed mitigating. Indeed, the intense fears of
dangerous youth typified by the superpredator panic of the '90s
bore clear racial overtones.163
as perhaps the defendant's mental illness[, then] due process of law would require that
the jury's decision to impose death be set aside" (internal citations omitted)).
161
In Johnson, Kennedy and O'Connor were similarly situated as majority and dissent
in a case that deemed youth adequately available to the jury to consider as mitigating even
if the evidence of it came in only under a future dangerousness query. Compare Johnson
v Texas, 509 US 350, 367, 368 (1993) (Kennedy, J) ("There is no dispute that a defendant's
youth is a relevant mitigating circumstance that must be within the effective reach of a
capital sentencing jury if a death sentence is to meet the requirements of Lockett and
Eddings. . . . The relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the
signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and
recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside. We believe that there is
ample room in the assessment of future dangerousness for a juror to take account of the
difficulties of youth as a mitigating force in the sentencing determination. As we recognized
in Graham, the fact that a juror might view the evidence of youth as aggravating, as
opposed to mitigating, does not mean that the rule of Lockett is violated. As long as the
mitigating evidence is within 'the effective reach of the sentencer,' the requirements of
the Eighth Amendment are satisfied." (citations omitted)); with id at 388 (O'Connor, J,
dissenting) ("'[Yjouth is more than a chronological fact.' The emotional and mental immaturity of young people may cause them to respond to events in ways that an adult would
not. Because the jurors in Johnson's case could not give effect to this aspect of Johnson's
youth, I would vacate Johnson's sentence and remand for resentencing." (quoting Eddings
v Oklahoma, 455 US 104, 115 (1982)).
162
See George S. Bridges and Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of
Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 Amer Soc Rev 554,
567 (1998).
163

See, e.g., John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, Weekly Standard
(Nov 27, 1995) at 23, 25 ("While the trouble will be greatest in black inner-city neighborhoods, other places are also certain to have burgeoning youth-crime problems that
will spill over into upscale central-city districts, inner-ring suburbs, and even the rural
heartland. . . . In the extreme, moral poverty is the poverty of growing up surrounded
by deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults in abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless,
and jobless settings."); William J. Bennett, John J. Dilulio, and John P. Walters, Body
Count: Moral Poverty . . . and How to Win America V War Against Crime and Drugs 28(1996)

2]

AGGRAVATING YOUTH

83

Simmons is white, so it is not clear whether or how race affects
an argument that youth is aggravating in his case. The opinion
makes no mention of race, but some of the briefs discuss it, and
the role of racism could be part of the subtext in Simmons.
Alternatively, or additionally, Simmons's identity as a white, blond
boy from the Midwest might strengthen the minoritizing vision
of him as a demon child. If his life was relatively easy, if he was
the boy next door, then his "badness" must come from inside rather
than from his surroundings, and thus he must be monstrous or
inherently evil.165
2. Teen criminality and romantic childhood. Relatedly, the fact that

a young person has committed a serious crime may in itself cause
people to view his youth as aggravating. That is, to the extent we
see or want to see childhood as a time of innocence, cognitive
dissonance may prompt us to reconceive a child who does terrible
things as an adult. The following prosecutorial argument from
another case seems to rely on this logic:
Scott Hain made the choices that took him down. He tried to
claim that he was functioning like a child. . . . What about his
conduct is child-like? Children don't commit rapes, assaults,
("[M]any of these super-predators grow up in places that may best be called criminogenic
communities . . . . At core, the problem is that most inner-city children grow up surrounded by teenagers and adults who are themselves deviant, delinquent, or criminal. . . .
The problem is not merely that so many inner-city children grow up insufficiently socialized to the norms and values of a civilized, noncriminal way of life, but that they grow
up almost completely unmoralized and develop character traits that are more likely to
lead them into a life of illiteracy, illicit drugs, and violent crime than into a lite otliteracy,
intact families, and steady jobs."); see also id at 14 (arguing that "the nation s drug and
crime problem is fueled largely by moral poverty, and put[ting] question marks over both
some of the liberal litany of 'root causes' (economic poverty, lack of government-runded
social programs, racism) and over some of the conservative^ catechism of toughness (resortlike prisons, too few executions, too much gun control)").
164
See, e.g., Brief for NAACP Legal Defense Fund, et al (cited in note 3); Brief for
Respondent at *31 (cited in note 3). Cf. Coker v Georgia, 433 US 584, 598 (1977) (holding,
without expressly mentioning race, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty
for rape of an adult woman); Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts 440 (1994) (explaining
that efforts to combat the death penalty for rape were launched "because almost 90 percent
of the 455 defendants executed for rape since 1930 were blacks convicted of raping white
women" and that these efforts ultimately translated "into a full-scale attack on capital
punishment, as arbitrary, cruel and unusual, and racist").
165
Cf. M i k e M a l e s , Framing Youth: Ten Myths About the Next Generation 2 9 2 - 9 4 (1998);
Kincheloe at 164 (cited in note 141). The notion of the demonic child has historic roots
in, among other sources, the Calvinist doctrine of "infant depravity," which deemed the
newborn doomed to sin unless the parents intervened to control him. See Skolmck at ^
(cited in note 144). Golding's Lord of the Flies supplies a contemporary analogue. William
Golding, Lord of the Flies 185-87 (1959).
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murder. That is not child-like. . . . In what way is he childlike?
. . . . What he is is what the evidence shows. He's vicious
and sadistic. That's not child-like.166
Moreover, as noted earlier, young people at the brink of adulthood may be particularly susceptible to at least the universalizing
idea of youth as aggravating. This is a period in the life span
characterized by increased criminality, which is part of what makes
it hard to identify those juvenile offenders whose criminal behavior
reflects deeply antisocial character as opposed to something more
transient.167 The particularly negative associations with juveniles
on the cusp of adulthood may help explain why Kennedy tends
to speak of juveniles in general, rather than sixteen- and seventeenyear-olds, although no one was arguing that Thompson should be
overturned or reinterpreted to mean that states could execute people who committed their crime at any age up to eighteen.
None of this squarely answers the question, though, of why
Kennedy would deem the possibility of juries treating youth as
aggravating as so obviously wrong as to justify a constitutional
166
Closing argument transcript at 916, Haiti v State of Oklahoma, Creek County Court;
see also Dobbs at 15 (cited in note 132) (stating Scott Hain's date of execution and age
at time of offense). In what seems to be similar rhetoric, at Michael Lopez's sentencing
for murdering a police officer when he was seventeen, the prosecutor argued:

At the age of 17, this man, instead of going to jail, chose and wanted to put a
bullet into the body of a police officer. What does that say about the capacity
and the mentality and the mind of this man at the age of 17? And he ain't a boy
and he ain't a child, he's a grown man, and he's been a grown man for a lot
longer than some of you were. He carried a weapon with him everywhere he
went. You know that. He wasn't afraid to use it that night when called upon.
Closing argument transcript at 28, Lopez v State, No 72,536 (Tex Crim App 2002) (quoting
the prosecutor, Kelly Siegler, of Harris County); see also Dobbs at 15 (cited in note 132)
(providing the prosecutor's name and reporting that Michael Lopez was sentenced to
death on May 25, 1999, and listing the docket number as No 73,356). Similarly, the
prosecutor of Dwayne Allen Wright argued, "This Defendant may have been seventeen
years old when he was involved in all these crimes, but he was seventeen years old going
on twenty seven. He has a streak of meanness that far exceeds the chronological age that
he has today." Closing argument transcript at 144, Virginia v Wright, No 70648 (Fairfax
Cry Circuit Ct, Nov 16, 1991).
167
See, e.g., Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 Psychol Rev 674, 675-79 (1993) (reviewing data
on the increased prevalence and incidence of illegal behavior during adolescence, with
offending rates peaking around age seventeen, and theorizing a nonobvious distinction
between individuals whose antisocial behavior is limited to their adolescent years and those
whose antisocial behavior is persistent over their lives); see also note 57 and accompanying
text (discussing the DSM-IV-TR's limitation on diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder
to those who are at least eighteen).
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ban. Perhaps he simply embraces the romantic notion of childhood
as a special time of innocence and vulnerability, which, as a set of
historians since Philippe Aries has been telling us in increasingly
refined ways, emerged in the mid-eighteenth century, largely displacing an idea that children were just smaller, and less able,
adults.168 As Steven Mintz has recently argued, this romantic notion of childhood—what Mintz calls the modern view—now exists
uneasily alongside a postmodern view of childhood, in which children are not seen merely as little adults, but are nonetheless
deemed to have adult-like knowledge and experience and buying
power.169 Perhaps Kennedy clings to the modern view and wants
to instantiate it into law.
3. Inflamedjurors. But this possible reading of Kennedy's opinion
goes too far. Kennedy does present an account of three relevant
differences between adults and juveniles, and uses these to create
a rule under law that removes them from the individualized consideration of the jury. Ultimately, however, I think his reasoning
turns at least as much on concerns about the potentially inflamed,
misguided, and mistaken "discriminator"—the juror—as on the
mind and emotions of the juvenile.
In particular, Kennedy is troubled by the prospect that jurors
will get it wrong and, particularly, for the wrong reasons. Our
ideas about youth are complicated. We think we favor youth, we
think we should favor youth, but in fact we may, in some circumstances, not only not favor them but actually disfavor them. Our
beliefs about how we do and should feel may not always track how
we actually feel. Jurors may, of course, err by failing to treat youth
(or any other mitigating factor) as appropriately mitigating. But
a tendency to do the opposite of what is expected—to treat youth
as aggravating—may inflict a harm that goes beyond the mere
error. To execute a juvenile because jurors treat him worse on the
basis of a trait that should make them treat him better may be
perverse, or irrational, to the point of unconstitutionality.
168
See, e.g., Mintz at 3-4 (cited in note 154); Hugh Cunningham, Histories of Childhood,
103 Am Hist Rev 1195, 1197-99, 1203-07 (1998); Harvey J." Graff, Interdisciplinary Explorations in the History of Children, Adolescents, and Youth—for the Past, Present, and Future,
85 J Am Hist 1538, 1539 (1999); see generally Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood: A
Social History of Family Life 411-13 (Robert Baldick transcript, 1962); cf. also note 155
and accompanying text (discussing Viviana Zelizer's thesis about recent changes in the
understandings of childhood).
169

Mintz at 3-4 (cited in not 154).
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To the extent that we limit young people's rights and responsibilities, we justify these limitations in part by saying that youth
are particularly vulnerable. To treat youth worse on the basis of
their special vulnerability—a vulnerability arguably increased by
the legal limitations imposed by the state170—partially undermines
the justifications for treating them differently in the first place.
And a jury that treats youth as aggravating enacts persecution in
place of protection. In this way, the rule of Simmons is a prophylactic rule that aligns our treatment of this group with our expectations, that is, with how we think we feel, and how we think
we should feel, about the group.171
Kennedy suggests further that a prophylactic rule is required
because of the seriousness of executing a young person. At the
close of his discussion of why we cannot trust juries to get it right,
Kennedy tells us: "When a juvenile offender commits a heinous
crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic
liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and his potential
to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity."172 The
irreversibility of any erroneous execution is of course a common
thread in arguments against the death penalty. But Kennedy is
making a more particular point. Young people should not be prevented by execution from growing up. They cannot be prevented
from growing up by negative attitudes and stereotypes against
them.173 This reasoning implicates another basis for society's treating youth differently from adults, a kind of rough justice rationale:
Young people will all be adults some day, and so the limitations
placed on them are temporary and common to everyone. Additionally, eighteen is the typical age demarcation for those legal
limitations, as Kennedy's appendices show. In this light, Kennedy
170
171
172

Cf. note 121.
Cf. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U Chi L Rev 190 (1988).

125 S Ct at 1197.
An oddity here is that he speaks almost as if juveniles are being executed, despite
the fact that the pace of death penalty proceedings and appeals means no juveniles are in
fact being executed. See, e.g., Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American
Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 Okla
L Rev 613, 631 (1983) (noting that "[n]o children have been executed since 1964"). We
may perhaps understand Kennedy to see executing juvenile offenders for acts committed
when they were young as similar to stopping time for them at that younger age, making
them no longer recognizable by the state after that point, since they are then condemned
to die for their actions at that time. Alternatively, his point may simply be animated by
the mere theoretical possibility of executing a minor.
173
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may be read to say that it is perversely unjust to let some of our
negative attitudes toward this class that we have partially created
prevent them from graduating into the dominant group. For these
reasons, among the others discussed, the risks of error are too
g r e a t both in frequency and severity—for a standard rather than
a rule.
This brings me back to O'Connor's and Scalia's claims that
Kennedy is saying that juveniles are categorically different, rather
than saying that youth is a good proxy for certain differences. As
noted earlier, Kennedy seems somewhat inconsistent, saying at
one point that he will not concede that any youth is sufficiently
mature and culpable to deserve death, and at another point that
this categorical rule is imperfect, because of course some juveniles
are more mature than adults and vice versa.174 But in light of the
foregoing, it seems that the different language of those two passages may be significant. In the first, Kennedy says that he won't
concede that there are juveniles who are sufficiently mature and
sufficiently depraved, and in the second, he says that only some
juveniles are (at least) sufficiently mature.
At the risk of overreading, the two statements may perhaps be
reconciled if we take Kennedy to be saying that even if a juvenile
were mature enough to be like an adult in all respects, a juvenile
simply cannot be depraved enough to warrant the death penalty,
because depravity is in the mind of the judge or juror. That is,
when speaking of depravity, Kennedy may be making a normative,
rather than an empirical, claim: Rather than saying that no child
could—as a matter of fact—ever be as mature as an adult, Kennedy
is saying that no one of us should—as a matter of law—fatally
judge a child to be as depraved as an adult. Even if there are a
few juveniles who could be among the worst of society's offenders,
jurors will make errors of unacceptable frequency and magnitude.
For this reason, we cannot trust ourselves to decide that a child
is culpable enough to be punished as an adult in an irreversible
way that fails to permit that child ever to become an adult.
Ultimately, Kennedy is saying that youth are categorically less
culpable than adults—not in the sense that they could not be as
bad or as guilty, but in the sense that we are too flawed to permit
ourselves to deem them to be so. We hold prejudicial stereotypes
174

See text accompanying notes 106-07.
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and attitudes that run directly counter to our expectations of ourselves and our proper treatment of young people, and the weighty
context of ending a young life requires a prophylactic rule to align
our expectations with our actions under law.
III. "AN ACT OF NOMOLOGICAL DESPERATION": THE
DENOMINATOR DISPUTE

Kennedy's conclusion that a prophylactic rule is necessary
to guard against disfavoring youth also plays a subtle role in his
discussion of the national consensus. Though apparently neither
compelling nor dispositive, evidence of a national consensus
against the juvenile death penalty must play some role in the
Court's decision. For instance, had there been no shift at all since
Stanford, or had the current spread of the states differed significantly from that in Atkins, or had the Court not found a majority
of states to be opposed, it seems unlikely that the Court would
have reached the same conclusion.175 In this light the Denominator
Dispute becomes important, as it determines whether even a majority of states opposes the juvenile death penalty.176 As noted, this
term refers to the disagreement between Kennedy and Scalia over
whether to count states that ban the death penalty altogether as
opposing the juvenile death penalty.
Kennedy counts states with no death penalty within the denominator, a departure from Stanford that Scalia calls "an act of
nomological desperation."177 In Scalia's view, the denominator
should include only those states that permit the death penalty,
because the fact that twelve states prohibit the death penalty for
everyone says "nothing—absolutely nothing—about consensus
that offenders under 18 deserve special immunity from such a
penalty."178 Kennedy, by contrast, reasons that "a State's decision
1/3
Although the Court found a "national consensus" in Atkins without counting the nodeath-penalty states as among the states opposed to executing people with mental retardation, the Court in Atkins faced a much more dramatic shift in relevant state enactments
since the time oiPenry, as the Court noted when distinguishing Stanford. Atkins v Virginia,
536 US 304, 315 n 18 (2002) ("A comparison to [Stanford], in which we held that there
was no national consensus prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders over age 15, is
telling. Although we decided Stanford on the same day as Penry, apparently only two state
legislatures have raised the threshold age for imposition of the death penalty.").
176

Cf. Norman J. Finkel, Prestidigitation, Statistical Magic, and Supreme Court Numerology
in Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, 1 Psychol Pub Pol'y & L 612, 614 (1995).
177
125 S Ct at 1219 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
178
Id (Scalia, J, dissenting).
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to bar the death penalty altogether of necessity demonstrates a
judgment that the death penalty is inappropriate for all offenders,
including juveniles."179
This is a puzzle, and one not much illuminated by Scalia's analogies. Writing for the majority in Stanford, Scalia criticized similar
reasoning by the dissent by comparing it to "discerning a national
consensus that wagering on cockfights is inhumane by counting
within that consensus those States that bar all wagering."180 He
is, of course, right in his narrower point, but the analogy is flawed.
A more pertinent analogy would be to counting states that ban
wagering on animal fighting as opposing as inhumane wagering
on cockfighting.181
In dissent in Simmons, Scalia's new analogy is to "including oldorder Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on the electric
car."182 Like the cockfighting analogy, Scalia's invocation of
179

Id at 1198.
Stanford v Kentucky, 492 US 361, 370 n 2 (1989) ("The dissent takes issue with our
failure to include, among those States evidencing a consensus against executing 16- and
17-year-old offenders, the District of Columbia and the 14 States that do not authorize
capital punishment. It seems to us, however, that while the number of those jurisdictions
bears upon the question whether there is a consensus against capital punishment altogether,
it is quite irrelevant to the specific inquiry in this case: whether there is a settled consensus
in favor of punishing offenders under 18 differently from those over 18 insofar as capital
punishment is concerned. The dissent's position is rather like discerning a national consensus that wagering on cockfights is inhumane by counting within that consensus those
States that bar all wagering. The issue in the present case is not whether capital punishment
is thought to be desirable but whether persons under 18 are thought to be specially exempt
from it. With respect to that inquiry, it is no more logical to say that the capital-punishment
laws of those States which prohibit capital punishment (and thus do not address age)
support the dissent's position, than it would be to say that the age-of-adult-criminalresponsibility laws of those same States (which do not address capital punishment) support
our position.").
181
Cf. Sanders v State, 585 A2d 117, 138-39 (Del 1990) (describing Scalia's reasoning
by analogy in Stanford as "opaque," and proposing that "[i]f one sought to discern a national
consensus that cockfighting is inhumane, one would certainly look to States that outlaw
cruelty to animals").
182
125 S Ct at 1219 (Scalia, J, dissenting) ("Consulting States that bar the death penalty
concerning the necessity of making an exception to the penalty for offenders under 18 is
rather like including old-order Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on the electric
car. Of course they don't like it, but that sheds no light whatever on the point at issue.
. . . In repealing the death penalty, those 12 States considered none of the factors that
the Court puts forth as determinative of the issue before us today—lower culpability of
the young, inherent recklessness, lack of capacity for considered judgment, etc. What
might be relevant, perhaps, is how many of those States permit 16- and 17-year-old
offenders to be treated as adults with respect to noncapital offenses. (They all do; indeed,
some even require that juveniles as young as 14 be tried as adults if they are charged with
murder.) The attempt by the Court to turn its remarkable minority consensus into a faux
majority by counting Amishmen is an act of nomological desperation.").
180
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Amishmen is more amusing than illuminating. Indeed, this analogy
is so far from helpful that it is quite difficult to rephrase it to
parallel the question in Simmons. The problem with Scalia's analogies is that he posits situations in which the underlying motivations are unrelated. But that is not the case in Simmons. Those
who oppose the death penalty always or nearly always oppose its
application to juveniles, if that is the best they can get.
One way to see the problem in Scalia's approach is to consider a
(hypothetical) national landscape in which nearly all states outlaw the
death penalty altogether. That is, if forty-two states prohibit the death
penalty, would Scalia say that the views of only the remaining eight
states would determine whether there was a national consensus
against the juvenile death penalty? If only two of the eight states that
permitted the death penalty outlawed the juvenile death penalty,
would Scalia really say that the relevant denominator is the eight
states, and no national consensus opposes the juvenile death penalty
because 75 percent of the states that count do not oppose it? This
seems absurd, and I will return to it.
With regard to age-based distinctions, the Denominator Dispute,
at first glance, appears to have inverted Scalia and Kennedy. Scalia,
discussing moral proportionality, dismisses as irrelevant age-based
distinctions in other contexts (e.g., in the majority's appendices on
voting, jury service, and marriage), whereas in the Denominator
Dispute he finds other contexts of age-based distinctions relevant.
Specifically, he believes that knowing how legislatures have made
age distinctions in criminal punishment more generally will help
resolve the Dispute.183 In contrast, Kennedy looks to the difference
between juveniles and adults intrinsically and legally in a range of
contexts to help make his proportionality argument, but in the
Denominator Dispute wants to take society's views about how to
treat people in general as representative of their views on how to
treat juveniles.
But on closer look, Kennedy's reasoning about youth here does
in fact track his reasoning in the proportionality analysis. Juveniles
are a lesser included group.184 That is, in a way that again elides
183
This is a departure from his position in Stanford where he presented as comparably
worthless the endeavors of looking at age in other criminal contexts and of looking at the
death penalty in general. See note 180.
184
125 S Ct at 1198 ("[A] State's decision to bar the death penalty altogether of necessity
demonstrates a judgment that the death penalty is inappropriate for all offenders, including
juveniles.").
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the distinction between the descriptive and the normative, Kennedy
seems to argue that we should treat juveniles as less culpable than
adults. States could not possibly—or rather, if they could, they
shouldn't—think adults should not be given the death penalty but
juveniles could. If members of any states think that people in general
must not be given the death penalty, then only (descriptively or
normatively) unacceptable views could lead them to say that they
would permit juveniles to be executed.
To make this more vivid, imagine a state that banned the death
penalty for adults, but permitted it for juveniles. (While the Court
"has said repeatedly that age is not a suspect classification,"185 it has
reached this conclusion only in the context of cases involving old
age,186 and such a statute might encounter Equal Protection problems,187 but this is not the question here.) Intuitively it seems unacceptable, and perhaps constitutionally so under the Eighth
Amendment, to mete out the ultimate punishment to juveniles and
not to adults. Fantastical as such a statutory scheme may seem, one
can imagine how a state might reach that point: for example,
through the kind of superpredator hype of the '90s,188 combined
"» Gregory v Ashcroft 50 US 4>2, 470 (1991) (cituig Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v
Murgia, 427 US 307, 313-14 (1976); Vance v Bradley, 440 US 93, 96-97 (1979)- Cleburne
v Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432, 441 (1985)).
185
Cf. Hedgepeth v Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 386 F3d 1148 1154 (DC
Cir 2004) (Roberts, J) (noting that "the Supreme Court cases applying rational basis review
to classifications based on age all involved classifications burdening the elderly" and then
rejecting the argument that youth is different from old age i n w a y s t h a t merit granting
it heightened scrutiny).
187
Ramos v Town ofVemon, 353 F3d 171, 187 (2d Cir 2003) (striking down under the
Equal Protection Clause a juvenile curfew ordinance based i n p a r t o n the reasoning that
restrictions on the constitutional rights of youth must aim to protect minors, to wit, "if
a municipality wishes to single out minors as a group to curtail a constitutional freedom,
which the minors have absent parental prohibition, then the municipality must satisfy
constitutional requirements by tying their policies to the special traits, vulnerabilities, and
needs of minors. . . ."); see also Bellotti v Baird, 443 US 622, 635 (1979) ("[Although
children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account
for children's vulnerability and their [other] needs.").

'*8 Cf. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators (cited in note 163); note 163 and
accompanying text; see also U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Youth Violence: A Report of the Surgeon General 5 (2001) (listing among the "myths about youth
violence" the idea that "[a] new violent breed of young superpredators threatens the United
States," and explaining that [tjhere is no evidence that young people involved in violence
during the peak years of the early 1990s were more freq Uent o r m o r e v i c i o u s offenders
than youths in earlier years. The increased lethality resulted from gun use, which has since
increased dramatically. There is no scientific evidence to document the claim of increased
seriousness or callousness . . . . ) .
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with several high-profile cases of terrible juvenile offenders,189 and
some social science literature arguing that young criminals will commit the worst crimes or that greater penalties are necessary to deter
young offenders because they are more criminally prone.190 Indeed,
the practice of worse treatment for juveniles is not historically unprecedented, but has been the basis for reforms of the juvenile
justice system over the past century.191
Such an upside-down scheme is simultaneously unimaginable and
comprehensible for the same reasons that the prosecutor's youthas-aggravating argument shocks and disturbs most who hear it, including Kennedy and, it seems, O'Connor.192 That is, we think we
treat youth more favorably, and think that we should so treat them
in general, but we also have an inkling that the reality of adult
stereotypes about and attitudes toward youth does not always track
these expectations. The upside-down statute may or may not have
a rational justification; the problem, as in Simmons, is that it might
stem from some combination of false stereotyping and sheer prejudice.
My imaginary state statute is a categorical rule, but it need not
be framed that way. What if instead the death penalty applied on
its face to everyone, but only juveniles ever ended up being executed? Here we have disparate impact, coupled with the "inexorable
zero" that may permit us to assume disparate treatment in administration.193 And what if juvenile offenders in this imaginary state
get the death penalty disproportionately (instead of exclusively)?
The conceivable disparate impact would raise a serious question for
the same reasons as the youth-as-aggravating argument.
189

See generally M a l e s at 2 9 4 (cited in n o t e 165).

190

Cf., e.g., M o i n A. Yahya, Deterring Roper's Juveniles: Why Immature Criminal Youth
Require the Death Penalty More Than Adults—A Law & Economics Approach 2 ( E x p r e s s O

Preprint Series Working Paper 761), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/761
(arguing that, if youth are present-oriented risk-lovers who cannot engage in proper costbenefit analysis, then law and economics methodology shows that youth can still be deterred but the penalties need to be greater than for adults, and thus that the Supreme
Court in Roper deprived the states of a valuable tool in combating juvenile crime).
191
See, e.g., Minow at 54-55 (cited in note 112); Elizabeth F. Emens, Nancy W. Hall,
Catherine Ross, and Edward F. Zigler, Preventing Juvenile Delinquency: An Ecological, Developmental Approach, in Edward F. Zigler, et al, eds, Children, Families, and Government:
Preparing for the Twenty-First Century 308, 311 (1996).
192
See note 3 and accompanying text.
193

See Tick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 1064 (1886); see also Infl Brotherhood of Teamsters v
United States, 431 US 324, 342 n 23 (1977) (quoting United States v T.l.M.E.-D.C, Inc.,
517 F2d 299, 315 (5th Cir 1975) (coining the phrase "inexorable zero")).
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Scalia thinks juveniles can be as bad as adults in some cases, so
society can reasonably think them so. Kennedy thinks they are rarely
as bad, and cannot possibly be worse, on the basis of youth itself,
so he imposes a rule to prevent jurors from thinking otherwise.194
That rule may be the logical principle underpinning Kennedy's
position in the Denominator Dispute.
By way of postscript, let me return briefly to the hypothetical in
which a state allows the death penalty only for juveniles. Curiously,
part of what makes Scalia's position on the Denominator Dispute
implausible, particularly in that hypothetical, is that it is hard to
imagine a person who cares enough about treating young people
the same as adults that her views on age parity would trump her
views on the death penalty. But, as we've seen, some youth libbers
suggest just that possibility when they critique Simmons for insidious
generalizing about youth.195 As youth libbers are not only marginal
but are generally not old enough to vote, though, a state's laws
presumably do not reflect such views.
Rather, it is easier to imagine a hypothetical state with the death
penalty only for juveniles because of popular opinion fueled by
negative attitudes to youth, than it is to imagine a state with the
death penalty for deserving individuals of all ages, based in a popular
embrace of youth liberation views. Though the "national consensus"
inquiry into the implications of legislative action is at best complicated and at worst deeplyflawed,196Kennedy's resolution of the
Denominator Dispute has the virtue of consistency with the logic
of his reasoning elsewhere in the opinion. As noted, it seems almost
inconceivable to think, in a scenario in which only a tiny fraction
of states still permitted the death penalty at all, that the question
of whether the states had reached a consensus on the juvenile death
penalty would turn on what percentage of the tiny remaining states
still executed juveniles.
The reason for this lies in part in Kennedy's alignment rule from
the proportionality analysis: That is, in imagining the scenario of
widespread opposition to the death penalty, we cannot help but read
into those many states Kennedy's presumption of youth as an included group—to be treated at least as favorably as adults if not
194

See text Part II.
See notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
196
See Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N C L Rev (forthcoming, 2006).
195
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more so—and to read out the alternative possibility that the citizens
of these many states oppose the death penalty for adults but not
for minors. So widespread is the assumption that progress lies in
the direction of abolishing the juvenile death penalty that the Missouri brief in Simmons even asserted that there is not "yet" a consensus among states against the juvenile death penalty.197 If the party
with the most interest in resisting the notion that progress means
not executing juvenile offenders assumed, in its brief before the
Court, that that point on the progress narrative will eventually
arrive, then the idea of treating youth favorably presumably has
wide appeal to our better selves.198 In his resolution of the Denominator Dispute, Kennedy makes a judgment about acceptable views
of youth by aligning our reasoning under law with how we think
we do, and should, treat young people.
IV. " T H E ENEMY OF FORTY": NEGATIVE ATTITUDES UNDER THE

ADEA
Kennedy's concern about negative attitudes toward youth in
Simmons has links to other areas of law in which age discrimination
is expressly forbidden. Kennedy's opinion suggests that attitudes to
age are complicated, and that we need to look closely not only for
stereotypes but also for prejudice, even in areas where individualized
treatment might generally be expected to lead to fair outcomes. In
this way, Simmons has implications for the Court's conclusions this
Term about a different group in a different area of law: older Americans under the ADEA.199
Consider through an antidiscrimination lens Kennedy's conclusion
that the Eighth Amendment requires in the death penalty context a
197
Brief of Petitioner at *21-*22 (cited in note 103) ("In Stanford, this Court identified
twelve states, out of thirty-seven that had capital punishment, that expressly excluded that
penalty as an option for the seventeen-year-old offender. Today, the situation is not appreciably different. We do not yet have a pattern of lawmaking sufficient to establish a
national consensus that capital punishment is 'cruel and unusual' when imposed on anyone
'so much as one day under' eighteen." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also
discussion in note 103.
198
Whether the word was a slip revealing underlying attitudes about progress, or an
intentional attempt not to sound so out of step with contemporary attitudes, the use of
"yet" here reflects something of the pervasiveness of the attitude that the abolition of the
juvenile death penalty lies on the road to progress. The fact that not-"yet" would seem
more surprising in an argument about attitudes to the death penalty for adults supports
the idea that the juvenile death penalty is widely considered a lesser included category.
199
29 USC §§ 621-34(2000).
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rule based on a rational and acceptable proxy—under eighteen as
mitigating—in order to preclude the possible use of an irrational or
at least unacceptable proxy—under eighteen as aggravating. At one
level, Kennedy's reasoning might seem to resemble the reasoning
supporting affirmative action. In both contexts, the state uses a prophylactic rule that favors a particular group in order to combat unfavorable stereotypes and attitudes. But on closer examination, two
key differences distinguish Simmonsh age-based rule from typical
affirmative action. First, affirmative action is usually based on concerns about a history of discrimination or pervasive negative attitudes
that require rectification. By contrast, in Simmons, individual jurors
are imagined to hold both positive and negative attitudes toward
youth. Kennedy's concern is that jurors will use the negative rather
than the positive, and so he imposes a rule to take the decision out
of jurors' hands and thus compel the favorable view of youth.
Second, the Simmons rule forbids individualized decisions,
whereas affirmative action requires them. The state, not the individual, acts affirmatively to protect the group. The state must adopt
a rule to implement the favorable stereotypes and oust the unfavorable ones. Rather than being like affirmative action, the Simmons
rule replaces an affirmative-action-type rule—the thumb-on-thescale individualized treatment of youth as mitigating—with a categorical rule.
Perhaps the Simmons rule looks more like the ADEA. An ageaware statute—which prohibits discrimination against people over
the age of forty200 and proscribes only discrimination in favor of
younger over older201—tries to prevent people from taking age into
account. To prevent people from using age negatively, the statute
prevents people from using age at all (subject to certain exceptions).
But the ADEA allows individual decision makers to fire individual
workers, so long as they do not do so on the basis of age. Indeed,
individual treatment is a core aim of the statute—to try to prevent
negative age-based stereotyping from preventing accurate assessment of individual skills and abilities. This clearly distinguishes the
statute from the rule in Simmons, which replaces individualized assessments with a categorical rule. A recent development in the
Court's interpretation of the ADEA, however, may have inched the
200
201

29 USC § 631 (a) (2000).
See General Dynamics Land Systems v Cline, 540 US 581, 584 (2004).
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statute closer to a group-based rule, rather than a rule that promotes
individualized consideration. In the same month that the Court
handed down Simmons, it ruled in Smith v City of Jackson that plaintiffs can bring disparate-impact suits under the statute.202
The case involved a disparate-impact challenge to a police department pay plan that gave larger raises to officers with less seniority. The plan was "motivated, at least in part, by the City's desire
to bring the starting salaries of police officers up to the regional
average."203 Most of the officers over forty had greater seniority and
therefore received smaller pay raises, forming the basis of the disparate-impact claim.204 The Fifth Circuit rejected the claim, holding
that disparate-impact suits are categorically unavailable under the
ADEA.2(b Responding to a circuit split on the question, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.206 The Court concluded that disparateimpact suits are available under the ADEA, but that the plaintiffs'
claim nonetheless failed.207
Smith finds O'Connor once again in dissent, though here Kennedy joins her. Stevens writes for a plurality, with Scalia concurring.
The opinions in Smith speak principally to questions of statutory
interpretation and agency deference, and I do not aim here to resolve the merits of these disputes or to assert that some hidden
logic drove the result. Instead, I want to use Simmons to highlight
an overlooked normative rationale for Smith and a way that the
decision in Smith might be used to combat a less obvious form of
age discrimination.
The Smith plurality and the dissent seem to agree more than disagree. First, they agree that age-based discrimination has little or
nothing to do with animus or dislike. Writing for a plurality that
includes Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Stevens reviews the
legislative history of the ADEA and notes the conclusion of the Wirtz
Report that "there was little discrimination arising from dislike or
intolerance of older people, but that 'arbitrary' discrimination did
202
Smith v City of Jackson, 125 S C t 1536, 1540 (2005) (plurality o p i n i o n ) (Stevens, J ) ;
id at 1546 (Scalia, J, concurring in the judgment and concurring in the conclusion that
the ADEA permits disparate-impact claims).
203
Id at 1539.
204
Id.
205
206
207

Smith v City ofJackson, 351 F3d 183, 187 (5th Cir 2003).
Smith, 125 S Ct at 1543 (citing cases).
Id at 1540 (plurality opinion); id at 1546 (Scalia, J, concurring).
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result from certain age limits."208 Similarly, O'Connor, in a dissent
joined by Kennedy and Thomas, reads the Wirtz Report as finding
no evidence of animus.209 (Scalia, whose concurrence is grounded in
an argument for agency deference, does not directly address the
issue.210) The report itself seems implicitly to acknowledge some role
for feelings and attitudes in age discrimination, as when it calls this
"a Nation which . . . worships the whole idea of youth." 2 " But parts
of the report support O'Connor's more absolute assessment of its
conclusions: "[In contrast to e]mployment discrimination because of
race [which] is identified, in the general understanding of it, with
non-employment resulting from feelings about people entirely unrelated to their ability to do the job[,212 t]here is no significant dis208
Id at 1540 (citing Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age
Discrimination in Employment 22 (June 1965), reprinted in U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Legislative History of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1981)
(hereafter "Wirtz Report")).
209

She writes,
[T]he Report emphasized that age discrimination is qualitatively different from
the types of discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (i.e., race, color, religion, sex, and national origin discrimination). Most
importantly—in stark contrast to the types of discrimination addressed by Title
VII—the Report found no evidence that age discrimination resulted from intolerance or animus towards older workers. Rather, age discrimination was based
primarily upon unfounded assumptions about the relationship between an individual's age and her ability to perform a job. Wirtz Report 2. In addition, whereas
ability is nearly always completely unrelated to the characteristics protected by
Title VII, the Report found that, in some cases, "there is in fact a relationship
between [an individual's] age and his ability to perform the job."

125 S Ct at 1553 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
210
Id at 1546-49 (Scalia, J, concurring). H i s concurrence in the relevant part of Stevens's
opinion, t h e part that m e n t i o n s t h e W i r t z Report's findings discussed here, suggests h e
agrees with this account.
211
W i r t z R e p o r t at 3 (cited in note 208) ("[T]he median age of t h e population in t h e
U n i t e d States is g o i n g down. . . . W h a t this means is that a N a t i o n which already worships
the whole idea of y o u t h must approach any problem involving older people with conscious
realization of t h e special obligation a majority assumes with respect to 'minority' g r o u p '
interests. T h i s is, t o be sure, o n e minority group in which we all seek, sometimes desperately, eventual m e m b e r s h i p . Discrimination against older workers remains, n e v e r t h e less, a problem which must be m e t by a majority w h o are n o t themselves adversely affected
by it and m a y even be its t e m p o r a r y beneficiaries. T h e 'discrimination' older workers have
most t o fear, however, is n o t from any employer malice, or u n t h i n k i n g majority, b u t from
the ruthless play of wholly impersonal forces—most of them part of what is properly, if
sometimes t o o casually, called 'progress.'").
212
O f course, this "general u n d e r s t a n d i n g " does n o t comprise all of race discrimination's
many forms. Cf., e.g., Charles R. Lawrence I I I , The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan L R e v 317, 322 (1987) ("Traditional notions
of intent d o n o t reflect t h e fact that decisions about racial matters are influenced in large
part by factors that c a n be characterized as neither intentional . . . n o r unintentional.").
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crimination of this kind so far as older workers are concerned."213
Second, the Justices agree that age often tracks many job-related
qualities and that the ADEA's reasonable factors other than age
(RFOA) defense is therefore much broader than the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense under Title VII.214 Thus,
while concluding that the statute provides for disparate-impact suits,
the Court finds that the RFOA defense applies in this case, and
implies that it would apply in many cases under the statute.215
Contrary to the Wirtz Report's conclusions, recent work in social
psychology suggests that we do experience age-based dislike, but
that we are unaware of it—that is, it is implicit rather than explicit.
And, in fact, even as we grow older and our explicit attitudes to
old age become more favorable, the line representing our implicit
attitudes remains basically flat: Our implicit negativity does not
decrease with age.216 Whether we call this animus—a term often
reserved for conscious dislike—these findings on implicit responses
to older people involve negative attitudes and not just false beliefs.
While we do not know for certain that these implicit negative
attitudes translate into discriminatory workplace behavior, research
indicates that older job applicants receive less favorable responses
than younger applicants,217 and it seems plausible that negative at213
W i r t z R e p o r t at 2 (cited in n o t e 208) (emphasis in original). T h e R e p o r t identified
t h r e e o t h e r types of discrimination t h a t d o affect older people: (1) rejection of older people
based o n "assumptions a b o u t t h e effect of age o n their ability to d o a job when there is in
fact no basis for these assumptions" (in t h e R e p o r t ' s terminology, ' " a r b i t r a r y discrimination'");
(2) "decisions n o t t o employ a p e r s o n for a particular job because of his age when there is

in fact a relationship between his age and his ability to perform his job" (which "does not exist"
in t h e context of race or religion and which should perhaps b e called " s o m e t h i n g else
entirely" r a t h e r t h a n discrimination); and (3) rejection of older p e r s o n s "because of p r o g r a m s and practices actually designed to protect t h e e m p l o y m e n t of older workers while
t h e y r e m a i n in t h e work force, and to provide s u p p o r t w h e n t h e y leave o r are ill." Id.
214

Smith,

125 S C t at 1545.

215

Id at 1546 (holding that granting larger raises to more junior employees was based
on a reasonable factor other than age, in that it furthered the legitimate goal of retaining
employees by raising salaries to match those in surrounding communities).
216
Levy and Banaji at 49, 54-55 (cited in note 125) (reporting that implicit negativity
remains constant while negative attitudes diminish until by age seventy-one respondents
think that they hold positive attitudes to older people); Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R.
Banaji, and Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefsfroma
Demonstration Web Site, 6 Group Dynamics 101, 108 (2002) (same). These studies are
comparing implicit attitudes to "young" versus "old," and thus showing a strong preference
for "young." This is consistent with the general feeling of favoring youth; it does not
undermine the likelihood that certain subgroups of young people—affected by criminality,
or race, or the cusp of adulthood—could prompt an unfavorable response. Research focused
on implicit attitudes in these areas would be very useful.
217

See, e.g., Mark Bendick, Jr., Charles W.Jackson, andj. Horacio Romero, Employment
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titudes of which we are unaware could affect our decision making in
ways that would be hard to anticipate, notice, or control.218 At the
least, these data suggest that we should be suspicious of age-based
classifications, and even age-based effects, despite the apparent rationality of age-based classifications and effects.219
That is, age may track many employment-related characteristics
and therefore be a rational proxy, but age-based distinctions
(whether intentional or unintentional) are nonetheless not necessarily rational—rather than based in negative stereotypes or attitudes—in any given case. Likewise, if older people don't realize that
or how much they disfavor their own group, then this calls into
doubt the argument made by Richard Posner (among others) that
employment discrimination laws on the basis of age are akin to the
"mad" idea of protecting black people from employment discrimination in a society run by a dominant majority of black people.220
The data on implicit attitudes trouble Posner's charges of madness.
His argument assumes in-group favoritism, or at least in-group
accurate individualized treatment. But, as noted, data suggest that
older people's negative implicit attitudes toward older people are
as strong as those held by younger people, and that these implicit
attitudes remain negative even after the bearer of the attitudes turns
seventy-one, the age at which our explicit attitudes to old age finally
Discrimination Against Older Workers, 8 J Aging & Soc Policy 25, 33-34 (1996) (reporting
that in pairs of resumes with equal qualifications, resumes implying that the applicant is
thirty-two received significantly more favorable responses than resumes implying that the
applicant is fifty-seven); Mark Bendick, Jr., Lauren E. Brown, and Kennington Wall, No
Foot in the Door: An Experimental Study of Employment Discrimination Against Older Workers,
10 J Aging & Soc Policy 5, 10-11 (1999) (extending the previous study beyond the initial
contact stage, and finding again that pairs of younger and older applicants to the same
jobs showed the younger applicants receiving more favorable responses).
218
Cf. Lawrence at 349 (cited in note 212) ("[W]hen the discriminator is not aware of
his prejudice . . . neither reason nor moral persuasion is likely to succeed.").
219
See also Brief for AARP, et al, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *23-*24,
Smith v City of Jackson, 125 S Ct 1536 (2005) (No 03-1160), 2004 WL 1356592 (citing
Levy and Banaji) (cited in note 125).
220
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Aging and Old Age 320 (1995) ("It is as if the vast
majority of persons who established employment policies and who made employment
decisions were black, federal legislation mandated huge transfer payments from whites to
blacks, and blacks occupied most high political offices in the nation. It would be mad in
those circumstances to think the nation needed a law that would protect blacks from
discrimination in employment. Employers—who have a direct financial stake in correctly
evaluating the abilities of their employees and who for the most part are not young
themselves—are unlikely to harbor either serious misconceptions about the vocational
capacities of the old (so it is odd that employment should be the main area in which age
discrimination is forbidden) or a generalized antipathy toward old people.").

100

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2005

turn from negative or neutral to mildly positive.221 (Moreover, the
implicit-attitude studies also call into question Posner's conclusion
with regard to race, as the studies suggest that blacks show slightly
negative implicit in-group attitudes.222)
These empirical findings have implications for the Court's decision in Smith. First, though the Court's decision was a matter of
statutory interpretation, to which my discussion does not speak,
these findings suggest that the conclusion the Court reached on the
statutory merits—that disparate-impact suits are available under the
ADEA—may also be sound as a matter of policy, at least to the
extent that we think the statute should attempt to root out negative
attitudes to old age.223 Second, and relatedly, these data suggest that
courts should be more circumspect than the Court's decision might
imply when concluding that employers have satisfied the RFOA
defense.
This circumspection in some way resembles the concern about
age-based attitudes in Simmons: We may think we like children,224
and we may think that our treatment of them will be fair and
rational, even where it differs from our treatment of adults, but
negative stereotyping and, more surprisingly, negative attitudes can
enter the mix and create a need for prophylactic rules. Similarly,
we might think that we like and respect older people, or at least
empathize with them through contact with our parents and other
relatives or through our own experiences as we grow older. But
even as we age, our implicit attitudes toward old age fail to improve,
suggesting a need for careful evaluation of workplace policies creating a disparate impact on older workers.
V CONCLUSION

In Simmons, Justice Kennedy confronts a difficult question:
Given that being younger than eighteen is merely a proxy for diminished culpability, why not let jurors decide whether youth mit221

Levy and Banaji at 55 (cited in note 125).

222

Nozek, Banaji, and Greenwald at 106 (cited in note 216).

223 'pkjg brief discussion of Smith does not attempt to resolve the larger normative
question of the merits of the ADEA, a subject of provocative and important debate. See,
e.g., Samuel Issacharoff and Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination? TheADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 NYU L Rev 780 (1997); Christine jolls, HandsTying and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 Tex L Rev 1813 (1996).
224
We may even think we "worship" them. Cf. Wirtz Report at 3 (cited in note 208);
note 211 (quoting relevant passage).
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igates the culpability of an individual sixteen- or seventeen-yearold offender? His subtle answer draws on psychological literature
about the differences between juveniles and adults, but turns as
much on concerns about the mind of the adult juror as on the
distinctive traits of juveniles.
In short, the argument has three steps. First, youth is a rational
proxy for diminished culpability. Second, jurors will sometimes fail
to consider youth as mitigating because they may have negative
stereotypes and, worse yet, negative attitudes toward youth. Indeed,
they may treat youth as aggravating, thus creating a peculiarly troubling type of error: treating an individual less favorably on the basis
of the trait, youth, that should prompt more favorable treatment.
Third, such errors are sufficiently weighty that the Eighth Amendment requires a prophylactic rule that removes such decisions from
the jury.
A concern about negative attitudes to youth also supports Kennedy's resolution of the Denominator Dispute, because Kennedy's
view could not countenance a state that applied the death penalty
only to juveniles; such a position would be akin to treating youth
as aggravating.
This understanding of Simmons does not establish the Tightness
of Kennedy's opinion. But it does suggest that the opinion is supported by a stronger rationale than it fully articulates, a rationale
that has implications for other areas of law involving the irrationality
of apparently rational categories. Another case from last term, Smith
v City of Jackson,225 which held that disparate-impact claims are
available under the ADEA, provides an example of a context in
which negative attitudes that may corrupt individualized determinations warrant further attention.
As Kennedy's Simmons opinion suggests, that age is a rational
proxy does not mean that people will apply that proxy rationally.
The legislative history of the ADEA discussed in Smith highlights
stereotyping to the exclusion of animus and implies that negative
attitudes toward older people are not a problem. But, as Simmons
shows, negative attitudes can arise in unexpected contexts, and recent work in social psychology supports the conclusion that we tend
to dislike older people more than we think we do. Thus, courts
should be on the alert for policies and decisions apparently based
225

Smith v City of Jackson, 125 S Ct 1536 (2005).
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on factors other than age that may nonetheless stem from unacknowledged negative attitudes about age.
A rhetorical flourish in the preceding Term's most significant
ADEA case, General Dynamics Land Systems v Cline,226 curiously

brings together the language of dislike with the idea that youth can
sometimes be the object of dislike: As Justice Souter put it, "The
enemy of 40 is 30, not 50."227 Of course the idea that age-based
dislike can be directed at younger as well as older—or at least the
idea that such dislike is a cause for concern—cuts against the holding
of Cline that the ADEA recognizes as discrimination on the basis
of age only actions favoring younger employees over their elders.
But Souter's language outruns his meaning: Youth, at least to those
who are no longer young, can indeed be aggravating.

226
227

General Dynamics Land Systems v Cline, 540 US 581 (2004).
Id at 591.

